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Abstract 
Excess capacity is a major issue in world fisheries. In addition to reducing the ability of 
managers to control the global harvest and increasing the potential for effort spill-over 
between fisheries, excess capacity introduces a prospective level of economic waste in the 
fishery. When there is excess capacity in a fishery, more inputs are being used than is 
necessary to produce the current output and economic theory suggests that the net benefit to 
society from the resource exploitation is not maximised. Fishery managers worldwide are 
concerned with reducing the levels of excess capacity in their fisheries. In fisheries where 
‘race to fish’ behaviour is prominent, competitive harvesting can also encourage inefficient 
investments in capital which create the potential for problematic excess capacity. Such 
behaviour is termed the ‘race to invest’ in this thesis. 
The objective of the thesis is to investigate how race to fish and race to invest behaviours 
affect the level of excess capacity. The thesis consists of three essays, in which excess 
capacity is examined in the open access fishery, where the race to fish and race to invest are 
pervasive, and also during a period of race behaviour in a catch-controlled fishery. The first 
essay investigates the relationship between the malleability of capital and the level of excess 
capacity using a dynamic model of the open access fishery. The malleability of capital in this 
essay is represented by a difference between the purchase and resale prices of capital. The 
second essay investigates the connection between environmental variation and excess 
capacity, also in the open access fishery. This essay characterises the emergence of excess 
capacity under transient fluctuations in recruitment, and also uses parameterised simulations 
to investigate excess capacity when there is a regular cyclical fluctuation in recruitment and 
for ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ regime shifts, where the recruitment of the fishery permanently 
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increases or decreases. In these essays, the race to fish and the race to invest are modelled 
separately, so the conventional race to fish determines the level of fishing effort (i.e. capacity 
utilisation) and the level of capital investment is driven by a race to invest, in which fishers’ 
expectations are formed myopically (according to the theory of projection bias). The third 
essay undertakes an empirical analysis of excess capacity and efficiency in the Tasmanian 
rock lobster fishery using the Data Envelopment Analysis methodology. This essay 
investigates whether the adjustment of the fishery, after the introduction of the Individual 
Transferable Quota (ITQ) system in 1998, has occurred over a prolonged period of time. This 
would suggest that the ITQ system may have a larger impact on excess capacity in that 
fishery than is indicated by comparable studies in other fisheries. In addition, this essay looks 
for evidence of the re-emergence of excess capacity in the fishery during a period of 
non-binding Total Allowable Catch (TAC) between the 2008 and the 2010 quota years. 
The results in this thesis highlight a potential trade-off between excess capacity and the 
biological outcome for the fishery, which suggests caution in using the level of excess 
capacity as an indication of the fishery’s health. The results also show that the reduction or 
elimination of excess capacity can be achieved through increasing the malleability of capital 
or by the cessation of competitive investment during transient positive fluctuations in 
recruitment. Finally, the thesis finds little evidence for a temporal change in either excess 
capacity or efficiency following the introduction of an ITQ system in the Tasmanian rock 
lobster fishery, and confirms that a period of non-binding TAC in that fishery was not 
associated with an increase in excess capacity. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Marine fish production is an important source of protein and supports the livelihoods of many 
people worldwide  (Coulthard et al., 2011, Badjeck et al., 2010, Pollnac and Poggie, 2006). 
According to the 2014 State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture report, the proportion of 
marine fish stocks harvested within biologically sustainable levels declined from 90.0 percent 
to 71.2 percent between 1974 and 2011 (FAO, 2014). Almost one third, i.e. 28.2 percent, of 
fish stocks were estimated to be overfished at the end of 2011. Despite the steady decline in 
fish production since the mid-1990’s, the number of vessels and fishers has continued to 
increase worldwide (FAO, 2014). The world population of fishers was in the order of 39.4 
million people in 2012, and has increased by around 4.1 percent per decade since 1990 (FAO, 
2014). In a 2009 report entitled The Sunken Billions: The Economic Justification for 
Fisheries Reform, the FAO and the World Bank jointly estimated that the lost economic 
benefit from global marine fisheries due to overfishing was in the order of US$50 billion per 
year, and pointed to excess capacity as a major contributor.  
Excess capacity occurs when more inputs are being used than is necessary to produce the 
given output, and consequently the net benefit to society from the resource exploitation is not 
maximised (Pascoe et al., 2003). In an optimally controlled, i.e. sole-owner, context such 
excess capacity reflects the profit-optimal decisions of the fisher (Poudel et al., 2013, Ward et 
al., 2005). Because prices and the biomass of the fishery fluctuate over time it may be 
beneficial to keep a higher capability to catch fish than is needed for most of the time, i.e. in 
order to take higher catches when economic or environmental conditions allow. However, in 
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situations where the fishery’s management is sub-optimal, so that behaviours associated with 
unregulated or pure open access fishing persist, it cannot be assumed that excess capacity 
represents the culmination of economically efficient decisions. Such excess capacity can 
reduce the ability of managers to effectively regulate catch and effort (Gréboval and Munro, 
1999), and when it is addressed by the reallocation of capital to other fisheries, may lead to 
the spill-over of fishing pressure between fisheries (Bockstael and Opaluch, 1983, Munro and 
Clark, 2003). Improving our understanding of the relationship between excess capacity and 
its drivers is important to the development of policies that can better avoid economic waste 
and inefficient harvesting in world fisheries. 
The literature identifies the concept of capital malleability, which describes the ease with 
which the capital stock can be adjusted, as being of central importance to the problem of 
excess capacity (Gréboval and Munro, 1999, Clark and Munro, 2002). When capital is not 
perfectly malleable, meaning that it cannot be immediately and costlessly adjusted either up 
or down by fishers, capital may be retained in the fishery that would otherwise be disposed of 
in order to achieve a given level of fishing effort. The literature also identifies a link between 
environmental variation and excess capacity in fisheries (Ward et al., 2005, Poudel et al., 
2013, Ludwig et al., 1993). In the pure open access fishery, Ludwig et al. (1993) describe the 
relationship between fluctuations in the abundance of fish and excess capacity. In a process, 
termed ‘Ludwig’s ratchet’, episodes of favourable recruitment improve the short run 
profitability of the fishery, and encourage fishers to increase fishing capacity. 
This thesis makes a contribution to our understanding of the roles of both the malleability of 
capital and environmental variation in explaining the emergence and persistence of excess 
capacity in fisheries where harvesters exhibit racing behaviour; that is where incentives 
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encourage wasteful competitive harvesting and investment. While there is a vast amount of 
literature regarding fishing capacity (Pascoe et al., 2003, Pascoe, 2007, Kirkley et al., 2002, 
Kirkley and Squires, 1999, Pomeroy, 2012) and on racing behaviours in fisheries (Townsend, 
1990, Feeny et al., 1996, Branch et al., 2006, Weninger and McConnell, 2000), very little 
work has focused specifically on the nexus between such behaviour and excess capacity. 
Furthermore, where such work exists in the literature it has not explicitly captured the 
development of excess capacity as an endogenous process fuelled by racing behaviour and 
affected by capital malleability and environmental variation. 
 
1.2 The race to fish and the race to invest 
Where resources are non-excludable and rivalrous in consumption, any more than a small 
number of harvesters will typically engage in a cycle of competitive overuse and 
overinvestment that culminates in resource degradation. This problem is well understood in 
fisheries (Gordon, 1954, Schaefer, 1957), where a lack of property rights or effective 
regulation, coupled with the possibility for prodigious gains, gives rise to competitive 
behaviours that are associated with overharvesting and resource depletion. This race to fish is 
typically accompanied by a race to invest, in which fishers accumulate fishing capacity in 
their competition for harvest (Weninger and McConnell, 2000, Branch et al., 2006, Munro 
and Clark, 2003, Gréboval and Munro, 1999). Depending upon the circumstances of the 
fishery, the margins over which capital is accumulated and rents dissipated include both the 
number of vessels in the fishery and the level of capitalisation of fishing activity, as fishers 
make inefficient use of inputs in their competition for harvest. 
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Such racing behaviours are particularly evident in unregulated, or pure, open access 
fisheries (Madau et al., 2009, Salayo et al., 2008, Teh and Sumaila, 2007). However, even in 
cases where fishers and fish stocks are subject to regulations that are imperfect or 
ineffectively enforced, behaviours and outcomes may resemble those characteristic of open 
access. For example, in fisheries regulated by input controls, such as a season length 
restriction or limited entry licencing, the development of excess capacity is well 
understood (Munro and Clark, 2003, Townsend, 1990). Under limited entry, excess capacity 
has long been known to result from ‘capital stuffing’ (Townsend, 1985), where the 
competition for harvest encourages fishers to gradually accumulate better gear, larger vessels, 
and other technology improvements over time. In fisheries regulated by a season length 
restriction, excess capacity has been demonstrated in connection with the competition for 
harvest and reductions in season length by the fishery’s manager (Munro, 2010, Munro and 
Clark, 2003, Gréboval and Munro, 1999). Even in catch controlled, ITQ managed fisheries, 
racing behaviour has been observed when the total allowable catch (TAC) does not bind the 
total harvest. In such circumstances, the fishery effectively reverts to a limited entry, 
regulated open access paradigm (Emery et al., 2014, Kompas et al., 2009, Grafton et al., 2007, 
Kompas and Gooday, 2007). Such fisheries also experience racing behaviour when fish 
populations are heterogeneous, so that some areas are more productive than others, and also 
when there are more favourable times to harvest during the fishing season (Costello and 
Deacon, 2007). 
Racing behaviour in open access fisheries is associated with the near sightedness, or myopia, 
of fishers’ behaviour. In traditional static equilibrium models of open access (Gordon, 1954), 
vessels continue to enter the fishery, so long as harvesters perceive a positive return from 
doing so. However, as rational profit seekers, fishers ignore the negative externalities, and 
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hence underestimate the cost their decisions impose on others as they either drawdown the 
fish stock or contribute to congestion among vessels, until all rents are dissipated through 
over-harvesting and over-investing. Dynamic bioeconomic models of open access which 
focus on the transition pathway of the fishery to equilibrium have also generally assumed that 
myopic harvesters enter the fishery in direct proportion to the current profit of the fishery, 
and not on forecast or projected profits (Smith, 1968, Smith, 1969, Bjørndal and Conrad, 
1987). In this myopic model, fishers effectively apply very high discount rates to future 
events so that only the present conditions are relevant for their decision making. Later work 
applied the idea of rational expectations in fisheries where fishers have perfect foresight 
about future conditions of the fishery (Berck and Perloff, 1984), and this has since been 
applied in a number of studies (McKelvey, 1985, Clark et al., 2005, Eisenack et al., 2006). 
Although there is a growing body of empirical literature examining different forms of 
expectations and decision making in fisheries (Teh et al., 2014, Johnson and Saunders, 2014, 
Feeny et al., 1996), the definitive nature of expectations in the fishery remains unclear. One 
such model of myopic expectations, and the one adopted for the theoretical modelling in this 
thesis, is ‘projection bias’, in which fishers interpret themselves in the future as being the 
same as themselves in the present, so that they place an overemphasis on the present 
conditions in decision making (Loewenstein et al., 2003, Loewenstein, 2000). Examples of 
this have been found in catalogue orders (Conlin et al., 2007), the volatility of equity prices 
(Mehra and Sah, 2002) and in the car and housing markets (Busse et al., 2012); and the 
importance of projection bias has also been investigated in medical decision making 
(Loewenstein, 2005). In the fisheries literature, Berck and Perloff (1984) applied this form of 
myopic expectations in their model of an open access fishery. 
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1.3 Fishing capacity and excess capacity 
Despite the importance of excess capacity to effective fisheries management, and the large 
amount of research that has been done in this area, both theoretically (Clark and Munro, 2002, 
Gréboval and Munro, 1999, Munro and Clark, 2003, Poudel et al., 2013, Ward et al., 2005) 
and empirically (Dupont et al., 2002, Kirkley et al., 2002, Vestergaard et al., 2003, Squires et 
al., 2010, Solís et al., 2014b), much terminology is still variously defined and is used 
inconsistently in many cases. The concepts of capacity and excess capacity in fisheries are 
difficult to both define and understand (Pascoe et al., 2003). 
The literature is dominated by three concepts of fishing capacity, and these are: ‘engineering’, 
‘economic’ and ‘technical’ capacity. Engineering capacity refers to the maximum power 
output (i.e. wattage) of equipment in the fishery (Pascoe et al., 2003, Berndt and Morrison, 
1981, Klein, 1960). This definition is widely regarded as being too simplistic for a 
meaningful economic analysis of fisheries, since it does not account for the behavioural 
characteristics of the fishery, i.e. the way fishers use their fishing equipment (Coelli et al., 
2001, Klein et al., 1973). By contrast, economic capacity explicitly accounts for optimising 
behaviour among fishers, and measures capacity in terms of some optimum value such as 
minimum cost or maximum revenue (Kirkley and Squires, 1999, Pascoe et al., 2003). Klein 
(1960), for example, defines economic capacity as occurring at the minimum of the short run 
average cost curve. When there are long run constant returns to scale, Berndt and Morrison 
(1981) note that this point also will be at a tangency of the short and long run average cost 
curves. More recent definitions include Coelli et al. (2001), Fousekis and Stefanou (1996) 
and Fagnart et al. (1999), who define economic capacity as the profit maximising level of 
output. In general, however, the lack of cost data in fisheries precludes the use of economic 
measures of capacity (Pascoe et al., 2003). Exceptions are, for example, Pascoe and Tingley 
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(2006) who use a non-parametric ray approach to estimate economic capacity, and also 
Lindebo et al. (2007) who estimate revenue-based capacity utilisation measures for the 
Danish North Sea trawl fleet. 
For this reason, fishing capacity is most often defined following a technical definition, where 
the fishing capacity is defined based on the maximum physical output of a fleet or vessel 
under normal or customary operating conditions (Pascoe et al., 2003, Johansen, 1968, Färe et 
al., 1989), and the modelling works in this thesis (Chapters 2 and 3) have adopted the 
technical definition of capacity. 
In fisheries economics literature, the maximum output attainable under normal operating 
conditions is referred to as fishing capacity
1
 and the capacity utilisation ratio is defined as the 
ratio of observed output to the fishing capacity, given the current biomass and conditions in 
the fishery (Pascoe et al., 2003, Kirkley et al., 2002, Gréboval and Munro, 1999, Kirkley and 
Squires, 2003). Using the technical definition of fishing capacity, excess capacity is said to 
exist when the capacity utilisation ratio is less than one, i.e. fishing capacity remains 
underutilised in the fishery. Excess capacity is therefore defined without reference to the 
optimum or target level of fishing capacity, as being any situation where the capacity 
utilisation ratio is less than one (Pascoe et al., 2003, Kirkley et al., 2002, Gréboval and Munro, 
1999). This is in contrast to overcapacity, which is defined based on the economic measure of 
capacity, and represents the difference between the observed and target levels of production 
in the fishery. The conventional technical definition of fishing capacity does not account for 
the optimising behaviour of fishers.  
                                                 
1
 The terms ‘capacity,’ ‘fishing capacity,’ and ‘capacity output’ have been used interchangeably in this thesis. 
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A variant of technical capacity that is commonly applied in empirical studies, and is used in 
the empirical work in this thesis (Chapter 4), is referred to as ‘technological economic’ 
capacity. This definition was suggested by Färe et al. (2000), and later Kirkley et al. (2002), 
and measures fishing capacity as the maximum observed, instead of the maximum physical, 
output for a given set of physical, environmental and economic conditions. By measuring 
capacity output directly from observed production data, the technological economic 
definition accounts for optimising behaviour to the extent that such behaviour is encapsulated 
in the measurements of an economic dataset. 
 
1.4 Thesis aims and structure 
The overarching objective of this thesis is to investigate the link between the racing 
behaviour of fishers and excess capacity. This is done within the open access fishery, where 
both race to fish and race to invest behaviours are prevalent, and also where race behaviour 
re-emerges in a managed fishery. Within the context of race behaviour, the role of two key 
factors known to influence the extent to which capital is accumulated and excess capacity 
occurs are explored. They are the malleability of capital and environmental variation. In both 
cases our interest is in how these factors interact with race behaviour to create excess 
capacity that persists in the long run equilibrium of the fishery and is not of a purely 
transitory nature. The thesis addresses these aims in three essays. 
The first essay (Chapter 2) focuses on the relationship between the malleability of capital and 
the emergent level of excess capacity in fisheries where the race to fish and the race to invest 
are prominent. Using a dynamic model of the open access fishery, this essay examines the 
connection between the range of steady state levels of excess capacity and the degree of 
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capital malleability. In a parameterised simulation of this model, the relationship between 
steady state excess capacity and the initial values of biomass and capital is investigated; as 
well as the importance of key economic and biological parameters (i.e. the price of fish, the 
fishers’ discount rate, the environmental carrying capacity and the intrinsic growth rate) in 
determining the level of excess capacity. 
The second essay (Chapter 3) investigates the link between environmental variation and 
excess capacity. Using an adaptation of the traditional Gordon-Schaefer model, this essay 
analytically investigates the emergence of excess capacity under transient increases or 
decreases in recruitment. In a parameterisation of the model, this essay further investigates 
levels of excess capacity for regular cyclical fluctuations in recruitment and also in the case 
of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ regime shifts, i.e. permanent increases and decreases in 
recruitment respectively. 
The models developed in both the first and second essays are novel in that they separate, 
analytically, the race to fish and race to invest behaviours, and thereby account for the 
endogenous emergence of excess capacity in the fishery. A common link between the first 
and second essays is also the modelling of fishers’ near sighted behaviour, which is captured 
in both essays according to the theory of ‘projection bias’ (Loewenstein et al., 2003, 
Loewenstein, 2000). However, the two essays contrast in their respective representations of 
capital malleability. In the first essay, capital malleability is represented by the difference 
between the purchase and resale prices of capital; and in the second essay it is modelled using 
the rate of capital depreciation, with higher rates denoting greater malleability. Both 
specifications are consistent with the models of such malleability proposed by Clark et al. 
(1979), and capture the ease with which capital can be retired from the fishery. In the case of 
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the first essay, capital malleability directly captures the cost of exiting the fishery by 
accounting for the difference between the purchase and resale price of capital. In general, the 
malleability of capital increases with the availability of alternative uses of the fishing capital 
and the ease of transitioning between different fisheries or fish stocks (i.e. the transferability 
of fishing rights, the universality of fishing equipment, and the geographic distance between 
fish stocks).  
The third essay (Chapter 4) presents an empirical analysis of excess capacity in the 
Tasmanian rock lobster fishery, which has been managed through an Individual Transferable 
Quota (ITQ) system since 1998. The essay uses the Data Envelopment Analysis methodology 
to estimate levels of efficiency and unbiased capacity utilisation from a census of log book 
data for the fishery from the 2000 to the 2013 quota years. Using these measures, the third 
essay investigates the change in excess capacity in the fishery during a period following the 
introduction of the ITQ system, intended to reduce or eliminate race behaviours, and over a 
period of non-binding TAC in the fishery, when race behaviour has been observed to re-
emerge. 
A final chapter concludes the thesis and suggests areas for future research. 
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Chapter 2. Excess Capacity and Capital 
Malleability in the Fishery with Myopic 
Expectations 
This essay has been accepted for publication in Marine Resource Economics. 
2.1 Introduction 
Fishing capacity has long been recognised as a major obstacle to the conservation and long 
term sustainable use of marine resources (Crutchfield, 1956, Gulland and Robinson, 1973, 
Clark, 1977). In 1999, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 
committed to an International Plan of Action for the Management of Fisheries 
Capacity (FAO, 1999). This plan called for FAO member nations to take immediate measures 
to monitor and address the level of capacity in their fisheries. Nevertheless, capacity remains 
a significant issue in world fisheries, and the goals of preventing the emergence of new, and 
of managing existing, capacity remain high on the policy agendas of fishing nations 
worldwide (FAO, 2008, OECD, 2009, Pomeroy, 2012, Salomon and Holm‐Müller, 2013).  
The emergence of excessive fishing capacity is widely associated with situations where the 
‘common-pool’ characteristics of the fishery result in a race to fish and invest (Clark and 
Munro, 2002, Munro, 2010). While such behaviour can persist in a regulated fishery 
(Homans and Wilen, 1997) and under a range of property institutions, including rights-based 
regimes (Costello and Deacon, 2007, Asche et al., 2008, Emery et al., 2014), the twin 
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problems of race to fish and race to invest behaviour are most pervasive in a fishery where 
access is unrestricted and fishing regulations are ineffective
1
. In the fisheries literature, 
overcapacity and excess capacity are defined as separate concepts and treated as different 
issues. Overcapacity is generally defined as the difference between the current and the target 
level of production in the fishery. The concept of overcapacity can be thus used as an 
indicator of long term excessive fishing capacity and used to indicate how much capacity 
needs to be adjusted in the fishery (Pascoe et al., 2003). Excess capacity, on the other hand, is 
defined as the difference between the current production level and the maximum potential 
production of the fishery for a given level of inputs under normal operating conditions.
2
 
Excess capacity is thus often portrayed as a temporary feature of the fishery, such as when 
fish stocks  vary over time and the level of potential catch is different for different stock sizes 
(Pascoe et al., 2003).  
Central to the problems of excess and overcapacity is the concept of malleable fleet capital 
(Gréboval and Munro, 1999, Munro, 2010), which describes the ease with which capital may 
be bought and sold. If capital is perfectly malleable, fishing capital can be bought and sold at 
no cost, so that there will be no excess and overcapacity in the fishery (Gréboval and Munro, 
1999). When this is not the case, the costliness of adjusting the capital stock will mean that 
fishing capital could be retained in the fishery that would otherwise have been disposed of in 
                                                 
1
 This is not to say that excess capacity does not exist in regulated, restricted access fisheries. 
2
 It is important to note that various definitions of excess capacity and overcapacity have been proposed and 
discussed in the literature (Gréboval and Munro, 1999, Clark and Munro, 2002, Pascoe et al., 2003, Ward et al., 
2005). In addition, the terms excess capacity, overcapacity and overcapitalisation are often used interchangeably. 
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order to achieve the desired level of fishing effort. This additional capital, whether it 
continues to operate in the fishery or remains idle, contributes to excess and overcapacity. 
The resulting economic waste emerges from the fact that the existing level of fishing capacity, 
such as the number of vessels, exceeds its ‘optimal’ or ‘target’ level and from the existence of 
underutilised capacity, which is a product of the vessels which are not engaged or not ‘fully’ 
engaged in fishing (Gréboval and Munro, 1999).  
Our main aim in this essay is to develop a stylised model to explore the relationship between 
the malleability of capital and the emergent level of underutilised capacity, referred to here as 
excess capacity, in the case of a fishery where fishers engage in both a race to fish and invest. 
Although operating the fishery with some underutilised capacity may be desirable when the 
harvesting and investment behaviours are both optimally controlled (Poudel et al., 2013), the 
process whereby capital accumulates and excess capacity emerges in the presence of the race 
to fish and invest behaviours is not well understood in the literature. In addition to the 
generation of pure economic waste in the form of underutilised fishing capacity excess 
capacity results in reduced ability of fisheries managers to effectively regulate effort and 
catch. Furthermore, where the problem of excessive fishing pressure in one fishery is 
addressed by reallocating underutilised capacity to other fisheries, excess fishing pressure 
may spill-over between fisheries (Bockstael and Opaluch, 1983, Munro and Clark, 2003). 
Understanding the drivers of excess capacity is therefore important for policy makers in 
developing measures that will result in improved management of marine resources by 
avoiding the problems of overharvesting and economic waste frequently associated with 
excessive fishing capacity (Munro and Clark, 2003, Pascoe, 2007). 
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There are a number of studies exploring issues of optimal fisheries management when capital 
adjustment is either not possible or costly (Clark et al., 1979, Charles and Munro, 1985, 
Boyce, 1995, Singh et al., 2006, Poudel et al., 2013). To the best of our knowledge, there are 
only a small number of existing models of the fishery in which incentives to race to fish and 
invest are represented and capital adjustment is assumed to be costly (McKelvey, 1985, 
Munro and Clark, 2003, Eisenack et al., 2006). The previous studies, however, assume that 
the existing capacity is either fully utilised or not utilised at all by the fishers who exploit the 
fishery and are therefore unable to account for the extent of excess capacity. As far as we are 
aware, our model is the first to incorporate both purchase and resale prices for capital, and to 
specify an endogenous level of capacity utilisation in the fishery where fishers engage in both 
a race to fish and race to invest. 
We develop a dynamic model of a fishery with quasi-malleable capital, in which there is no 
constraint on investment, but such adjustment is costly because underutilised capacity can be 
sold only at a price lower than its purchase price (Clark et al., 1979). The model incorporates  
race to fish behaviour based on the assumptions of the conventional open access fishery 
model (Smith, 1969, Bjørndal and Conrad, 1987). We adopt the investment rule described by 
McKelvey (1985), in which the capital stock is adjusted such that the average return to 
current capital is equalised to the average cost of investing, thereby representing the race to 
invest. Consistent with the traditional portrayal of fishers’ behaviour in the open access 
fishery as a race to fish based on observed current profits (Smith, 1969, Bjørndal and Conrad, 
1987) and with empirical evidence (Feeny et al., 1996, Teh et al., 2014), our model assumes 
that fishers form expectations on the returns to capital with reference to current conditions in 
the fishery only. This form of myopic behaviour is known as projection bias in the 
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behavioural economics literature (Loewenstein, 2000, Frederick et al., 2002, Loewenstein et 
al., 2003). 
The contributions of this essay are twofold. First, we analytically characterise the evolution 
of the capital stock and the fish stock with quasi-malleable capital and show that multiple 
equilibria with varying levels of excess capacity exist due to the different purchase and resale 
prices of capital. Second, using a parameterised version of our model, we show how the 
initial conditions of the fishery, that is the initial levels of the biomass and capital stock, 
influence the steady state level of excess capacity that will emerge in the fishery where a race 
to fish and invest is pervasive. We further explore the sensitivity of this relationship for 
various biological and economic parameters. 
 
 
2.2 The model 
2.2.1 Fishing effort and capital  
In the conventional bioeconomic model of the fishery, fishing effort represents an aggregate 
measure of the levels of all inputs, such as time, capital, labour and fishing gear. Following 
Clark et al. (1979), however, we separate capital from other inputs involved in fishing and 
assume that the level of fishing effort, E, is constrained by the capital stock, K, measured in 
standardised vessel units, such that 0 E K  . We further assume that E K , such that 
[0,1]  is the capacity utilisation ratio which measures the proportion of the current capital 
stock effectively engaged in harvesting. Our specification of ϕ in this way is consistent with 
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the technical definition of capacity (Kirkley and Squires, 1999, Pascoe et al., 2003).
3
 Using 
this definition, capacity utilisation in this essay is measured as the ratio of the production of 
the fishery to the maximum potential production for a given level of inputs, under normal 
operating conditions.
 
 
2.2.2 Harvest function and biomass dynamics 
For the harvest and effort relationship, we use the Schaefer production function (Schaefer, 
1957) given as: 
 
h = qxE = qxϕK (2.1) 
 
where h is harvest, q is the catchability coefficient and x is the total biomass of the fish stock.  
The biomass dynamics are: 
 
                                                 
3
 An alternative definition of capacity is the ‘economic’ definition, which attempts to account for an optimum 
level of output in terms of the economic parameters of the fishery. Klein (1960) and Berndt and Morrison (1981) 
develop such a concept based on short run and long run average cost curves. Fagnart et al. (1999) and Coelli et 
al. (2001) propose definitions centered on a profit-maximising level of output, while others define capacity in 
terms of the firm’s cost and revenue functions (Färe et al., 2000). In most fisheries, however, the general lack of 
cost data often precludes the use of economic measures (Pascoe et al., 2003). A variant of this definition, known 
as technological-economic capacity is commonly used in the empirical literature to measure capacity in 
fisheries (Dupont et al., 2002, Kirkley et al., 2002, Squires et al., 2010). 
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( )x G x qx K   (2.2) 
 
where G(x) is the natural growth of the population and we use the density-dependent logistic 
growth function  ( ) 1G x rx x x  , 
where r is the intrinsic growth of the fish species and x  
is the environmental carrying capacity. 
2.2.3 Fishery profit and malleability of capital 
The economic profit of the fishery accounts for the cost and benefit of investment in addition 
to the net revenue generated from fishing (Clark et al., 1979), such that: 
 
( )fph cE c I     (2.3) 
 
where p is the unit price of landed fish, c is the cost per unit of fishing effort and I is the level 
of investment. The cost of investment, ( )fc I , for the two cases of investment (I > 0) and 
disinvestment (I < 0) in the capital stock is given as: 
 
     if    0
( )
     if    0
I
f
S
c I I
c I
c I I

 

 (2.4) 
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where cI and cS are the purchase and resale price of capital, such that cI > cS > 0. 
Clark et al. (1979) characterise the level of malleability of capital in terms of investment, I, 
and the purchase and resale price of capital, cI and cS, and the rate of depreciation on capital, 
γ.4 In the general case of quasi-malleable capital in which there is a secondhand market for 
capital (cs > 0), there is no constraint on investment (-∞ < I < ∞), but such adjustment is 
costly because the capital cannot be sold in the secondhand market at its purchase price (cI > 
cS). We represent the relationship between the purchase and resale prices of quasi-malleable 
capital in terms of two key parameters: the depreciation rate of the capital stock, γ, and the 
rate of time discount rate, δ, as:5 
                                                 
4
 When capital is perfectly non-malleable, investment is irreversible. Disinvestment or resale of capital is not 
possible ( 0I  and cS = 0) and the depreciation on existing capital is zero (γ = 0). By contrast, when capital is 
perfectly malleable, investment is immediately reversible so that capital can be disinvested at its purchase price. 
There is no constraint on investment ( I    ) and the purchase and resale prices of capital are assumed equal 
(cI = cS).  
5
 From Equation (2.4), replacing the depreciation on a single vessel, i.e. .(1)I    , costs I Ic I c   at an 
instant of time. Using the standard cost of capital for the fishery, i.e.    (Clark et al., 1979), the present value 
of this cost over the duration of a vessel’s life can be given as 
( )
0
.s Ic c e d
   

   . Solving this equation gives 
( )s Ic c    , which is Equation (2.5). This identity will hold in a competitive market because, if the scrap 
vessel is more expensive than 
sc , the owner will prefer to source replacement parts from a wholesaler or the 
vessel’s manufacturer. Whereas if the scrap vessel is less expensive than 
sc , the scrap capital will become the 
owner’s preferred source of parts. In this case, the demand for scrap vessels will increase, which will push up 
their price, and this should continue until scrap vessels are no longer less expensive than the replacement parts 
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I
s
c
c

 


 (2.5) 
 
The level of capital malleability, therefore, decreases as the time discount rate increases, 
reflecting the fact that the resale price of capital, cS, in a competitive market will fall as the 
present value of the stream of services is expected to yield declines. Similarly, with 
Equation (2.5), capital is assumed to be more malleable at higher rates of capital depreciation, 
which effectively result in a shorter period of time being needed for a given capital stock to 
be reduced by the non-replacement of depreciated capital. In this essay we are interested in 
the case of quasi-malleable capital, where cI > cS > 0, and thus we assume that the discount 
rate δ and the depreciation rate γ are positive. Equation (2.5) can also be written as a ratio of 
the resale price of capital to the purchase price of capital, so that  ( ) 1s Ic c      . We 
use this ratio as a measure of capital malleability, such that the closer the ratio is to one, the 
easier it is to adjust capital in the fishery and hence the greater the malleability of capital. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
from a wholesaler or the manufacturer. The value ( )
0
.s Ic c e d
   

    therefore represents the price a vessel 
owner will ultimately be prepared to pay for a scrap fishing vessel. 
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2.2.4 Net investment 
In a fishery involving a race to invest, positive economic profits attract new fishing operators 
that represent additional capital stock in the fishery. This continues until all economic returns 
from capital investment have been dissipated. We capture this capital accumulation process 
in our model by assuming the capital stock in the fishery continues to grow ( 0K  ) so long 
as capital in the fishery earns a positive economic profit, or specifically so long as the 
average return to current capital (  ) is greater than the purchase price of capital ( Ic  ). 
Likewise, we assume that capital is removed from the fishery ( 0K  ) when the average 
return to current capital is below the resale price ( Sc  ), since in this case fishers will profit 
from disinvesting the underutilised capital. Finally, we assume that fishers will have no 
incentive to adjust the capital stock ( 0K  ) when the average return to current capital is 
between the purchase and resale prices ( S Ic c  ). Given this investment behaviour, the 
evolution of the capital stock can be written as: 
 
1
f
K K
c
 
   
 
   or   
 
 
1
0
1
I
S
c K
K
c K




 
 
 if   
I
I S
S
c
c c
c




 

 (2.6) 
 
where the term  1fc   indexes the relative size of the average return on investment to its 
price in the fishery. Using Equation (2.6) together with the capital dynamics equation 
, we derive the investment rule as: K I K 
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1
f
I K K
c


 
    
 
 (2.7) 
 
Following McKelvey (1985) we specify the expected current value of the average return on 
investment at time t as:  
 
( )( )( ) max ( ) ,0e t
t
t pqx c e d    

       (2.8) 
 
where max[.] is the max operator and ( )ex   is the expected level of biomass for the future 
period t  . Given that the values of ( )ex   are not realised at time t for all t  , the average 
return on investment at time t depends on the expectation of the future biomass level. In our 
model we adopt a form of myopic behaviour known as projection bias, where individuals 
systematically interpret themselves in the future as being similar to how they are in the 
present, and therefore place an over-emphasis on current conditions when making 
decisions (Loewenstein, 2000, Loewenstein et al., 2003). Examples of projection bias have 
been established in the behavioural economics literature (Frederick et al., 2002, Mehra and 
Sah, 2002, Loewenstein, 2005, Busse et al., 2012) and Berck and Perloff (1984) also use this 
form of myopic expectations in their model of an open access fishery. Projection bias 
contrasts with the traditional model of myopia (Smith, 1969, Bjørndal and Conrad, 1987) in 
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which fishers apply extremely high discount rates to future events (Johnson and Saunders, 
2014, Teh et al., 2014) so that only the present conditions determine their behaviour. 
Assuming that in their race to invest, where fishers’ expectations of future conditions are 
formed myopically, future biomass is expected to be the same as current biomass, (i.e., 
( ) ( )ex x t   for all t  ), the average return to current capital given in Equation (2.8) can be 
re-written as:
6
 
 
  ( )( )( ) ( ) t
t
t pqx t c e d   

     (2.9) 
 
Integration of Equation (2.9) yields: 
 
   ( ) ( )t pqx t c      (2.10)
7
 
 
                                                 
6
 The max[.] operator no longer appears in this expression since the fishery would not shutdown in advance of 
the realization of negative net harvest revenue under the assumption of myopic expectations. 
7
 Unlike McKelvey (1985), the average return on investment at time t in our model does not follow a dynamic 
specification. The dynamic specified by McKelvey relies on the assumption of perfect foresight and disappears 
when we adopt projection bias. 
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Equation (2.10) represents the average return on investment at time t in the fishery with 
myopic expectations of future biomass. 
2.2.5 Capacity utilisation ratio and excess capacity 
In the presence of race to fish behaviour, fishing effort increases so long as the economic 
profit from the fishery is positive (Smith, 1969, Bjørndal and Conrad, 1987). We capture this 
process in our model through the adjustment in the capacity utilisation ratio, ϕ, which we 
assume occurs instantaneously and thus  ( )fc I pqxK cK    from Equations (2.1) and 
(2.3). Using this capacity utilisation ratio and the investment rule in Equation (2.7), the 
proportion of current capital engaged in fishing can be derived as: 
 
 
 
11
      if         
                     if                        
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
 
  
 
 (2.11) 
 
where the capacity utilisation ratio is bounded between zero and one. 
The capacity utilisation ratio in Equation (2.11) represents the level of underutilised capacity 
in the fishery. In this essay, we use ϕ to index the level of excess capacity as 1     where 
  takes a value between zero and one. For example, 0  implies that the fishery operates 
at full capacity, and hence 1Ch h   where Ch  is the maximum harvest level attainable in the 
24 
 
fishery for a given capital stock (i.e., capacity output). In contrast, when 0 1 , the actual 
level of harvest is less than the full capacity output, such that 1Ch h  , and therefore excess 
capacity exists in the fishery. Given Equation (2.11), the level of capacity utilisation, ϕ, and 
hence excess capacity, 1    , in the fishery is uniquely determined for a given level of 
the biomass, x, the catchability coefficient, q, and the economic parameter values of the 
fishery. 
2.2.6 The dynamics of a fishery with quasi-malleable capital 
Figure 2.1 presents a capital-biomass phase portrait showing the dynamics of the capital stock, 
K, and biomass, x, in a fishery with quasi-malleable capital. The evolution of the capital stock 
is defined by three regions, denoted as Region 1, Region 2 and Region 3. The boundaries 
between the regions are defined by the solid vertical lines at x x   and x x   where 
   Sx c c pq 
       and    Ix c c pq 
      . In Region 1, the capital stock in 
the fishery decreases because the average return to current capital is below the resale price of 
capital ( Sc  ) prompting disinvestment. By contrast, the capital stock increases in Region 3 
because the average return on investment is greater than the purchase price ( Ic  ). In 
Region 2, the average return to current capital is between the purchase and resale price 
( S Ic c  ) and the capital stock is stable. 
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Figure 2.1: Phase portrait: capital and biomass dynamics with quasi-malleable capital.  
 
Using Equation (2.11), we identify ranges of the biomass associated with corner solutions 
where the current capital stock is either fully utilised (ϕ = 1) or not utilised at all (ϕ = 0). In 
Region 1, when the biomass is between  ax c pq  and    (1 )( )b sx c c pq      , no 
capital is utilised. In Region 3, the current capital is fully utilised when the biomass is greater 
than    (1 )( ) (1 ) (1 )c Ix c c pq              . For all other areas of the phase plane, 
the capacity utilisation ratio is between zero and one ( 0 1  ). From an examination of ax , 
bx , cx , x   and  it can be shown that, for all parameterisations of the model, the following 
holds true: 
 
x 
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0 a b cx x x x x x        (2.12) 
 
The evolution of biomass is determined by the biomass nullcline which is the set of curves 
marked as 0x   in Figure 2.1. The biomass nullcline represents the combinations of capital 
and biomass for which the fish stock is constant over time, such that: 
 
0x         
 1rx x x
K
qx

  (2.13) 
 
Using Equations (2.11) and (2.13), we derive the full specifications of the biomass nullcline 
for all levels of biomass as summarised in Table 2.1. The dynamics of the fishery with quasi-
malleable capital in our model are characterised by this biomass nullcline and the dynamics 
of the capital stock as discussed above. For instance, in Region 3 where the capital stock in 
the fishery increases over time, the biomass increases when the level of capital is below the 
biomass nullcline. This situation reflects a fishery where the level of exploitable biomass is 
high, but the number of existing vessels exploiting the fish stocks is small and, in turn, the 
biomass increases. Conversely, the biomass decreases in the same region when the capital is 
above the nullcline because the number of vessels exploiting the fish stock is high and fishing 
pressure on the fish stocks is correspondingly relatively high. In Region 1, when the biomass 
is below the traditional bionomic equilibrium, x
a
, the average return to current capital given 
in Equation (2.10) is negative and this leads to an immediate disinvestment of existing capital 
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to the level where there is no capital stock in the fishery and therefore the fishery is 
economically collapsed. By contrast, in the same region but when the biomass is above the 
traditional bionomic equilibrium, the average return to current capital is positive and 
therefore the economic collapse of the fishery does not occur. This is a feature of the myopic 
characteristic of fishers’ investment behaviour. 
 
Table 2.1: The biomass nullcline 
Biomass level Region The biomass nullcline 
0 ax x   Region 1 1
r x
K
q x
 
  
 
 
a bx x x   Region 1 0
lim K

   
bx x x    Region 1 
   
    
1
1 S
r x x pqx c
K
q pqx c c
 
  
  

     
 
x x x    Region 2 
  1
I
r x x pqx c
K
qc 
 
  
cx x x    Region3 
   
    
1
1 I
r x x pqx c
K
q pqx c c
 
  
  

     
 
cx x x   Region3 1
r x
K
q x
 
  
 
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2.3 Results 
The overarching aim of this essay is to explore the link between the extent of capital 
malleability and excess capacity in the case of the fishery with quasi-malleable capital. We 
do this, in the first instance, analytically through an examination of model equilibria, that is 
capital-biomass combinations for which there is simultaneous stability in the capital stock 
( 0K  ) and the biomass ( 0x  ) of the fishery. Such equilibria are depicted in Figure 2.1 as 
the set of points along the biomass nullcline in Region 2. By contrast, in Regions 1 and 3, 
such equilibria cannot be found given that capital is either increasing or decreasing for all 
biomass levels in these regions. Equilibrium that lie on the positively sloped portion of the 
biomass nullcline in Region 2 are unstable in that minor perturbations in either the capital or 
biomass will result in further movements away from the equilibrium. We focus, therefore, on 
the set of stable equilibrium that lie on the negatively sloped portion of the Region 2 biomass 
nullcline. 
An examination of Figure 2.1 indicates that the range of such biomass levels is determined by 
the relative positions of x  , x   and Gx . For the case in which  1 2Gx x c pq     lies 
between x   and x  , as in Figure 2.1, the range of stable biomass is positively related to the 
cost of fishing effort, c.  In contrast, the range of stable biomass is narrowed for higher 
population carrying capacity, x , catchability coefficient, q, and fish price, p. The equilibrium 
level of biomass in our model is greater than the level at the traditional bionomic equilibrium, 
x
a
, because investment decisions are assumed to be costly in our model. In other words, our 
model retains the traditional bionomic equilibrium at ax  when the cost of investment is zero, 
i.e., cI = cS = 0 
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2.3.1 Excess capacity and quasi-malleable capital 
Stable equilibria that lie on the negatively sloped portion of the Region 2 biomass nullcline 
are associated with varying levels of excess capacity,  . More formally, for stable equilibria 
in the biomass range between Gx  and x
 , excess capacity ranges between a minimum of 
max
min 1     and a maximum of 
min
max 1    ,  where 
max  and min  are the maximum 
and minimum steady state capacity utilisation ratios given as: 
 
max 2( ) min ,1G I
c
x
pqx c

 
 
   
 
 (2.14) 
min ( )x

 
 
 

 (2.15) 
 
The maximum capacity utilisation ratio, max , and hence minimum excess capacity, min , 
occurs at the biomass level Gx , which is the smallest biomass on the stable portion of the 
biomass nullcline. In contrast, the minimum capacity utilisation ratio, 
min , and hence 
maximum excess capacity, max , occurs at the highest stable equilibrium biomass level x
 . 
Our results therefore suggest that the level of underutilised capacity and the biomass at the 
equilibrium are positively related in the fishery with quasi-malleable capital. However, as is 
evident from Figure 2.1, the equilibrium level of capital stock in the fishery increases with a 
decrease in the level of underutilised capacity. That is to say, the total fishing effort, ϕK, 
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increases as the equilibrium capacity utilisation ratio increases and the associated increased 
fishing effort results in a smaller level of biomass at the equilibrium (Figure 2.1). 
We also find from Equation (2.14) that the minimum level of excess capacity, min , will be 
higher, and hence the range of possible equilibrium excess capacity smaller, the lower is the 
unit price of landed fish, p, or the higher is the cost per unit of fishing effort, c, for a fishery 
with a given carrying capacity and level of capital malleability. Furthermore, Equations (2.5) 
and (2.15) together indicate that min
S Ic c  , where S Ic c  indexes the malleability of 
capital as discussed in the section of fishery profit and malleability of capital. The greater is 
the malleability of capital, therefore, the higher the minimum steady state capacity utilisation 
ratio, min , will be. That is to say, when capital is easier to adjust, as indicated in our model 
by a smaller wedge between the purchase and resale prices of vessels, the smaller is the 
maximum potential excess capacity, max , in the fishery. When capital is perfectly malleable 
or 1S Ic c  , for instance, the existing capital will be fully engaged in harvesting.  
2.3.2 Initial conditions and equilibrium excess capacity 
The dynamics of the capital stock, K, and biomass, x, in our model are shown in the phase 
portrait in Figure 2.1 and discussed at the end of the model section. Casual observation of 
these dynamics suggest that the starting values of biomass, x0, and capital, K0, will determine 
both the trajectories and speed of adjustment of both variables and, therefore, uniquely 
identify the steady state level of excess capacity arising in the fishery. That is, the condition 
of the fishery at the point at which a race to fish and invest begins determines the level of 
excess capacity in the steady state. 
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We simulate a parameterised version of our model to investigate the nature of this 
relationship by calculating the equilibrium capacity utilisation ratio, * , for different 
combinations of the initial capital stock, K0, expressed in terms of standardised vessel units 
ranging from 10 to 500, and the initial biomass, x0, in terms of the proportion of the 
environmental carrying capacity
8
. Each simulation is conducted for 1000 periods to ensure 
that the fishery converges to the steady state. Benchmark parameter values are reported in 
Table 2.2. The parameter values for p , q , c, r  and x  are from Bjørndal and Conrad (1987) 
and the remaining parameters, Ic , sc ,  , and  , are from Singh et al. (2006).   
 
Table 2.2: Model parameterisation 
Parameter Value Description 
p  36.68 Price per tonne ($) 
q  6.77 × 10
-4
 Catchability coefficient 
c 38895 Cost per unit of fishing effort ($) 
   0.100 Depreciation rate of capital stock 
   0.048 Time discount rate 
r   0.800 Intrinsic growth rate 
x   3200000 Environmental carrying capacity (tonnes) 
Ic   236500 Purchase price of capital ($) 
Sc   159800 Resale price of capital ($) 
  
                                                 
8
 It seems reasonable to analyse the adjustment of the fishery from a variety of initial conditions given we know 
that a large number of vessels are mobile between fisheries worldwide. When capital migrates into a fishery it 
can be pushed away from the adjustment path it would have taken from its “previously unexploited” state (i.e. 
x0= x   and K0=0). 
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Figure 2.2: Steady state capacity utilisation ratio for different initial biomasses and capital 
stocks.  
 
 
Figure 2.2 presents the steady state capacity utilisation ratio for different combinations of the 
initial capital stock and biomass. The surface in Figure 2.2 comprises four distinct Areas, I, II, 
III and IV.  In Area I where the initial biomass is below the traditional bionomic equilibrium 
0 0.46
ax x x  , regardless of the size of the initial capital stock, the fishery shuts down due 
to negative returns to current capital, resulting in no capital stock in the fishery and therefore 
zero capacity utilisation. The surface plot in Figure 2.2 demonstrates an increasing 
relationship between both the initial biomass and capital stock of the fishery, and the steady 
state capacity utilisation ratio, 
* . That is, the higher initial levels of the biomass and capital 
stock correspond to greater levels of capacity utilisation ratio and, therefore, less excess 
capacity in the fishery. For instance, Area IV represents combinations of initial capital stock 
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and biomass that result in * 1   and no excess capacity in the steady state. In Area IV, the 
high initial values of the biomass and capital stock will mean higher levels of new investment 
and therefore greater depletion of the biomass (Region 3 in Figure 2.1), and this eventually 
causes the average return to current capital,  , to fall below the resale price of fishing 
vessels, sc . The underutilised capital will then be sold off and the fishery will equilibrate 
with full capacity utilisation at . 
Figure 2.2 further shows that the maximum excess capacity at *  67.6min    percent 
occurs in the plateau of Area II, which represents about 23.0 percent of the set of initial 
values of the fishery examined in this essay. Furthermore, when the initial biomass is above 
51.0 percent of the environmental carrying capacity, 0 0.51x x , increasing the initial capital 
will increase the steady state capacity utilisation ratio up the ridgeline in Area III toward full 
capacity on the plateau in Area IV. For example, when the initial level of biomass is 76.0 
percent of the carrying capacity, 0 0.76x x , an initial capital of 0 130K   will result in 
* 67.6min    percent in Area II, whereas an initial capital of 0 230K   will lead to the 
higher capacity utilisation ratio of 
* 81.1   percent in Area III. If the initial capital stock 
further increases to 0 280K  , an initial biomass of 0 0.76x x  will give rise to an 
equilibrium with full capacity, * 1  , on the plateau of Area IV. 
2.3.3 Sensitivity analysis 
Equilibrium outcomes in the fishery, for key fisheries variables such as biomass, effort and 
harvest, have been shown to be sensitive to changes in biological and economic parameters in 
fisheries bioeconomic models (Gordon, 1954, Smith, 1969, Bjørndal and Conrad, 1987). 
* 1 
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Thus, we analyse the sensitivity of the steady state capacity utilisation ratio, * , to four key 
parameters, namely the price of fish, p, the environmental carrying capacity, x , the intrinsic 
growth rate, r, and the time discount rate, δ. Specifically, we calculate the proportion of  the 
simulated trajectories corresponding to different initial conditions in the fishery that 
culminate in the maximum steady state capacity utilisation ratio, max * (Area IV) and the 
minimum capacity utilisation ratio, min *  (Area II) for a 10.0 percent increase and 
decrease in the base case value for each of the parameters, p, x , r, and δ. 
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Figure 2.3: Sensitivity analysis of steady state capacity utilisation ratio: the percentage of 
simulated trajectories stabilising with min *  or max *  for variation in the parameter 
values 
 
    
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 2.3 show that increasing the unit price of landed fish, p , or the 
environmental carrying capacity, x , decreases the proportion of trajectories achieving the 
maximum steady state capacity utilisation ratio 
max *  and increases the proportion of 
trajectories achieving the minimum capacity utilisation ratio 
min * . In other words, the 
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higher the price of fish or the greater the maximum size of the population, the greater the 
likelihood of the steady state capacity utilisation ratio being either min * 1    or min *  
and therefore the higher the potential for excess capacity in the fishery. Panel (c) shows a 
similar case where increases in the intrinsic growth rate, r , decrease the likelihood of 
max *  but increases the likelihood of min * . For instance, when the intrinsic growth 
rate is r =0.72, about 11.5 and 25.1 percent of the simulated trajectories achieve the 
maximum and minimum steady state capacity utilisation ratio respectively. By contrast, when 
the intrinsic growth rate increases to r = 0.88, the proportion of the simulated trajectories 
achieving the maximum and minimum steady state capacity utilisation ratio becomes 7.2 and 
28.3 percent respectively.  
In the case of the time discount rate, δ, Panel (d) of Figure 2.3 shows that lower values of the 
discount rate result in a greater proportion of the trajectories culminating in both the 
maximum and minimum capacity utilisation ratio, max *  and min * . These changes 
reflect the two effects a change in the time discount rate has on the steady state capacity 
utilisation ratio. When the discount rate decreases, ceteris paribus, fishers put more weight on 
future returns and the average return to capital increases as reflected in Equation (2.10). At 
the same time, however, decreasing the discount rate also increases the size of the resale price 
of capital relative to its purchase price, ceteris paribus, effectively making capital more 
malleable as reflected in Equation (2.5).  
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2.4 Conclusion 
Managing fishing capacity remains one of the biggest issues facing fisheries managers 
worldwide (Lutchman and Hoggarth, 1999, FAO, 2008, OECD, 2009). While much of the 
recent literature focuses on measures aimed at reducing capacity (Clark et al., 2005, Squires, 
2010, Pascoe et al., 2012), effective management also requires controlling the emergence of 
new capacity (FAO, 2008, OECD, 2009, Pomeroy, 2012, Salomon and Holm‐Müller, 2013). 
Thus understanding the process whereby capital accumulates and excess capacity emerges, 
particularly in fisheries where incentives to race to fish and invest are pervasive, and where 
capital is quasi-malleable, remains an important and under-studied issue.  
We address the need to understand this process in this essay by proposing a model that allows 
us to describe the dynamic process whereby excess capacity, measured as the level of 
underutilised current fishing capacity, emerges in a fishery when there is a wedge between 
the purchase and resale prices of capital and where capital depreciates. For the case in which 
fishers form expectations of future biomass and harvest myopically and where the well-
documented race behaviour in common pool resources exists in the fishery, we show that the 
fishery will have multiple stable equilibria of the capital stock and biomass that are 
distinguished by a varying capacity utilisation ratio. Our model results reinforce the 
importance of capital malleability in explaining the possible state of equilibrium excess 
capacity in such fisheries, identifying a positive relationship between the minimum steady 
state capacity utilisation ratio in the fishery and the ease with which downward adjustments 
in the capital stock can be made. That is to say, the easier it is to dispose of  underutilised 
capacity in a secondhand market, as indicated in our model by a smaller wedge between the 
purchase and resale prices of vessels, the smaller is the maximum potential level of excess 
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capacity in the fishery. The comparative statics of our analytical results indicate that, when 
capital is non-malleable, fisheries based on higher value species, with higher intrinsic growth 
rates or greater carrying capacity will be more susceptible to persistent, long run underutilised 
capacity as these conditions, that have been shown to strengthen the race to fish and lead to 
greater overexploitation (Clark, 2010), also fuel the race to invest and excess capacity. 
Furthermore, the set of stable equilibria in our model reflects a range of possible outcomes in 
which high biomass and low capacity utilisation go hand in hand in the fishery where fishers 
engage in a race to fish and invest, indicating a possible trade-off between economic and 
conservation objectives. Our model shows that the problem of overexploitation in the fishery 
is underpinned by the large accumulated capital stock, but this does not correlate with the 
presence of high levels of excess capacity. This observation of a possible trade-off between 
excess capacity and stock size highlights the importance of understanding the dynamic 
process of capital accumulation across a range of institutional contexts, and under alternative 
assumptions about investment behaviour. Overall our results suggest caution in using the 
extent of excess capacity, as defined in this essay as the equilibrium level of underutilised 
capacity, as the sole indicator of the health or performance of the fishery (World Bank, 2012). 
For example, different methodologies have been developed to estimate the capacity 
utilisation of a fishery (Kirkley et al., 2002) and such methodologies have been used to 
evaluate the fishery performance as well as to assess the effects of changes to management, 
such as from command-and-control management to rights-based fisheries. However, our 
results suggest that such estimates alone should not be used to determine the state of the 
fishery in terms of the excess accumulation of capital stock. 
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Simulations of a parameterised version of our model further enabled us to explore the 
relationship between the level of equilibrium excess capacity in the fishery and the initial 
state of the fishery in terms of starting stocks of biomass and capital. Understanding this 
relationship will be particularly pertinent in cases where capacity management programs in 
fisheries with high levels of underutilised capacity result in the redeployment of displaced 
fishing capacity to other stocks or fisheries (Gréboval and Munro, 1999) or where climate 
change driven changes in the abundance and distribution of commercial fish stocks motivate 
the reallocation of fishing effort and capacity as fishers adapt (OECD, 2010). Our results 
indicate that, while higher initial levels of capital will result in more severe overexploitation 
and greater equilibrium capital stock, there is a negative relationship between the initial 
capital stock and the equilibrium level of excess capacity in the fishery. Applying a higher 
initial stock of capital to a biomass of given size will result in more overexploitation but also 
in less underutilised capacity in the fishery. Understanding this trade-off will help managers 
charged with rebuilding fisheries and managing fishing capacity. 
Conventional bioeconomic models of fisheries assume perfectly malleable capital and do not 
help us to understand the process of capital investment and the development of excess 
capacity. While there are some studies dealing with fisheries with non-malleable 
capital (McKelvey, 1985, Eisenack et al., 2006), they are unable to account for the extent of 
excess capacity as their models assume that the existing capacity is either fully utilised or not 
utilised at all. We take a step in this essay toward developing this understanding by exploring 
the issue of excess capacity, or underutilised capacity, in the fishery with quasi-malleable 
capital. It is well known that the free-entry-and-exit nature of open access fisheries leads to 
over-investment in fishing capital, overexploitation of target and bycatch species and the 
dissipation of economic rent. We show that where capital is quasi-malleable, the open access 
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nature of the fishery also results in excess capacity. That is, rather than being a purely short 
run feature, even in equilibrium it is possible that fishing capacity remains underutilised in 
the fishery. 
While implementing policies that address the root causes of excess capacity in fisheries by 
removing incentives that drive race to fish and to invest behaviour remains paramount, the 
question of how to manage existing excess capacity remains unclear. Our results suggest that 
increased utilisation of current capacity without eliminating the race behaviour would result 
in further overexploitation of already vulnerable stocks; yet, efforts to remove and or 
redeploy excess capacity may be costly and have the potential to exacerbate excess capacity 
in other fisheries. This observation reinforces the need to approach the problem of fisheries 
capacity management as an issue at the sectorial or multi-fishery, rather than single fishery, 
level (Holland, 1999) and makes the question of how best to manage existing capacity in such 
fisheries to meet economic, social and environmental goals, as they transition to regulated 
fisheries, of central importance. Furthermore, the importance of designing effective capacity 
management policies goes beyond the case of the fishery where the fishing regulations are 
either absent or ineffective as incentives to compete in harvesting and investment among 
fishers is evident in fisheries under a range of regulatory regimes, including individual 
transferable quotas (Costello and Deacon, 2007, Emery et al., 2014).  
A number of limitations to our analysis suggest useful directions for future research. A key 
feature of our model is the assumption that fishers are myopic and that they form 
expectations of the average return to current capital based only on the current level of the 
biomass in deciding the level of capital investment or disinvestment. While this assumption is 
consistent with the spirit of open access resource use, incorporating alternative ways in which 
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fishers form expectations (Holland, 2008) into harvesting and investment behaviour would be 
useful. In addition, and as called for by Nøstbakken et al. (2011), exploring the effect on the 
development of capacity of alternative investment rules or heuristics, reflecting alternative 
types of fishery business organisations would be useful. Finally, our model of capital 
accumulation in the fishery is deterministic and as such does not account for the high levels 
of natural variability that are characteristic of many fish populations (Caddy and Gulland, 
1983, Hofmann and Powell, 1998). For example, when the fish stock is subject to natural 
fluctuations, some level of excess capacity is acceptable or even desirable in the fishery 
where the fishing effort and investment rate are controlled optimally (Poudel et al., 2013); yet, 
it is unclear whether excess capacity, which is ultimately developed through the race to invest 
behaviour, is similarly acceptable, or if not, what the economic costs or benefits with the 
development of such excess capacity would be. The extension of our work to incorporate the 
effects on the capital stock and excess capacity of uncertainty, in particular environmental 
variation, is needed. 
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Chapter 3. Excess Capacity and Environmental 
Variation in Open Access Fisheries  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Many fisheries are subject to fluctuating environmental conditions that lead to changes in the 
recruitment of the fishery (Reed, 1974, Reed, 1979, Clark, 2010, Kuparinen et al., 2014, 
Lehodey et al., 2006, Walther et al., 2002). In upwelling systems, for instance, many fish 
populations exhibit spawning strategies that are affected by the seasonal fluctuations in 
enrichment, concentration and retention that characterise such systems (Walther et al., 2002, 
Lehodey et al., 2006, Picaut, 1983, Adamec and O'Brien, 1978, Lewis, 1981, Shannon, 1985, 
Shillington, 1998). There is also growing evidence that the recruitment of fisheries is subject 
to dramatic and long-lasting changes that reflect underlying shifts in the state of the 
ecosystem (Ling et al., 2015, Möllmann and Diekmann, 2012, Miller et al., 1994, Hare and 
Francis, 1995, Russell et al., 1971).  
It is commonly understood that excess capacity
1
 in fisheries is linked to changes in 
environmental conditions (Ward et al., 2005, Squires et al., 2003).
2
 However, papers which 
                                                 
1
 In this essay, as in Chapter 2 of this thesis, fishing capacity refers to the ability of the fleet to harvest fish, and 
is measured as the maximum harvest of the fishery given normal or customary operating conditions, when the 
variable inputs to production are fully utilised (Pascoe et al., 2003). Excess capacity occurs when the harvest of 
the fishery is lower than the capacity harvest of the fishery. 
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explicitly model the connection between environmental variation and excess capacity are rare. 
In an open access fishery that is subject to environmentally-driven fluctuations in recruitment, 
Ludwig et al. (1993) describe a relationship between fluctuations in the abundance of fish and 
excess capacity. In a process termed ‘Ludwig’s ratchet’, episodes of favourable recruitment 
improve the harvest and encourage the accumulation of capacity. When the capital is 
non-malleable, meaning it cannot be immediately and costlessly adjusted, the capacity 
accumulated during favourable fishing conditions cannot be reversed when the recruitment 
returns to its ‘normal’ levels. This means that the newly acquired capacity contributes to the 
level of excess capacity in the fishery. Such behaviour in the open access fishery is associated 
with the well-known race to fish which also manifests as a pressure to invest (Weninger and 
McConnell, 2000, Branch et al., 2006). In this thesis we therefore characterise such behaviour 
as the race to invest. 
In a model of the open access fishery, where such race behaviour is at its most intense, we 
investigate the link between different types of environmental variation and excess capacity. 
Using a variant of the traditional Gordon-Schaefer model we examine the effects of both 
‘positive’ and ‘negative’ fluctuations in environmental conditions, which represent low-
frequency increases or decreases in the level of recruitment respectively. These fluctuations 
occur over time increments that are of sufficient length for the biomass of the fishery to be 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
2
 The relationship between excess capacity and fluctuations in environmental or economic conditions in a sole 
owner fishery is described by Ward et al. (2005). In cases where fisheries regulations eliminate the race to fish, 
Ward et al. (2005) demonstrate that excess capacity is self-correcting over time. 
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stable at each point in time. In contrast to the traditional model, we represent the harvesting 
and investment decisions of the fishers as separate races, allowing us to measure the 
proportion of the current capacity engaged in harvesting via the capacity utilisation ratio. We 
assume the net revenue from harvesting is equal to zero, a condition that is consistent with 
the long-run equilibrium of the Gordon-Schaefer model (i.e. where the economic profit of the 
fishery is exhausted). This implies a certain level of capacity utilisation for the fishing fleet as 
a whole, and in our model this level is captured by the capacity utilisation ratio. To model the 
adjustment of the capital stock we adopt the investment rule described by McKelvey (1985) 
in which the capital stock expands up to the point at which the expected net present value of 
investment equals the purchase price of capital. We further assume that fishers form an 
expectation of the return to investment based only on the current fishing conditions, i.e. 
myopically (Berck and Perloff, 1984, Loewenstein et al., 2003, Loewenstein, 2000).
3
 These 
changes in the capital stock are modelled as ‘pulse’ investments. While gradual changes in 
capital may be observed over finer time-scales, all changes in capital appear as ‘instantaneous’ 
in the long-run model considered for this paper. 
To the best of our knowledge the analysis presented in this essay represents the first explicit 
investigation of the link between excess capacity and environmental variation in fisheries 
where the race to fish and the race to invest are prominent. We undertake an analysis for two 
types of capital: i) perfectly non-malleable capital, which does not depreciate and cannot be 
                                                 
3
 As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, this form of myopia is symptomatic of a phenomenon called 
‘projection bias’, where individuals perceive themselves in the future as being much the same as themselves in 
the present, and therefore place an overemphasis on the present conditions in their decision-making behaviour 
(Loewenstein et al., 2003). 
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disinvested; and ii) quasi non-malleable capital, which does depreciate over time but cannot 
be disinvested (Clark, 2010, Clark et al., 1979). We first investigate the persistence of excess 
capacity as a result of transient fluctuations in environmental conditions, during which the 
recruitment increases or decreases to a new level before returning to the original (‘normal’) 
state. In a parameterisation of our model with quasi non-malleable capital, we further 
investigate excess capacity for regular cyclical fluctuations in recruitment and also in the case 
of both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ regime shifts, where the recruitment of the fishery 
permanently increases and decreases respectively. As a baseline for our analyses we assume 
an initial state in which recruitment is at its long-term ‘average’ level and a single fishing 
vessel is active in the fishery. 
 
3.2 The model 
3.2.1 Recruitment and environmental variation 
We assume a logistic specification of density dependent growth for the fishery’s biomass, 
G(∙), shown below as: 
 
  . 1 tt t t
x
G x z rx
x
 
  
 
 
(3.1) 
 
46 
 
where xt is the total biomass of the fish stock (in tonnes) at time t, r is the intrinsic growth 
rate of the fishery and x  is the environmental carrying capacity. The variable zt captures the 
effect of environmental variation on the growth of the fishery’s biomass. We assume initially 
that the value of zt is one, which represents the long run average (‘normal’) level of 
recruitment. A positive fluctuation in zt (i.e. zt > 1) reflects a favourable change in the 
environmental conditions and results in an increase in the recruitment of the fishery, and this 
represents a period of high growth in the biomass. Conversely, when negative fluctuations 
occur (i.e. 0 < zt < 1) the recruitment of the fishery decreases and this results in a period of 
slower growth in the biomass. We use the variable zt to capture different types of 
environmental variation. In particular we explore three different scenarios for the fluctuations 
in recruitment. These are: i) transient fluctuations in which a single-episode of either higher 
or lower recruitment occurs; ii) regular fluctuations in which recruitment moves up and down 
according to a regular cycle in the environmental conditions; and iii) both positive and 
negative ‘regime shifts’ where recruitment permanently increases or decreases in the fishery 
(Lehodey et al., 2006, Kuparinen et al., 2014, Walther et al., 2002). 
3.2.2 Investment in open access fisheries 
In race to fish fisheries where fishers are also engaged in the race to invest, capital 
investment ( tI ) occurs through a series of changes in the capital stock ( tK ), during which 
fishers equate the expected net present value of a unit of investment at time t, t , with the 
purchase price of capital, Ic  (McKelvey, 1985). When investing in new capital is profitable, 
i.e. t Ic  , fishers replace depreciated capital and purchase extra capital so that t  is equal 
to the purchase price of capital Ic . When such investment is not profitable, i.e. t Ic  , no 
new capital will be purchased and any depreciated capital will not be replaced, so that the 
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level of investment It = 0. If t is equal to the purchase price of capital (i.e. t Ic  ) then 
fishers maintain the current level of capital by replacing depreciated capital so that t tI K , 
where γ is the rate of depreciation.  
Following McKelvey (1985) we specify t  as: 
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where 
e
x
 , 
e
K
  and 
eh  are the expected levels of the biomass, capital stock and harvest, 
respectively, for the future time periods t  ; and p is the unit price of fish and 0  is the 
time discount rate.  ,e eW x h   is the expected total cost of harvesting for the future time 
periods t  . 
Since the future time paths of x , K  and h  are not known for all t   at time t, the 
expected net present value of a unit of investment at t depends on fishers’ expectations of the 
future. As in the first essay of this thesis (Chapter 2), we adopt a form of myopic behaviour 
known as ‘projection bias’ where the fishers interpret themselves in the future as being the 
same as themselves in the present, and therefore place an over-emphasis on the current 
conditions in their decision-making process (Loewenstein et al., 2003, Loewenstein, 2000). 
As discussed in the introduction to the thesis, the near-sighted (i.e. myopic) behaviour of 
fishers is central to the race to fish and the race to invest in the fishery. In circumstances 
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where such race behaviour is prominent, the fishers will expect future levels of the biomass, 
the capital stock and the harvest to be the same as in the present, i.e. 
e
t
x x

 , 
e
t
K K

  and 
e
t
h h

  for all t  , and the expected net present value of a unit of investment will be: 
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In contrast to McKelvey (1985), who assumes the full utilisation of capital for all t, we allow 
the fishing capital to be used at a proportion of its fishing capacity, so that 0 ≤ ϕt ≤1 is the 
capacity utilisation ratio and the level of fishing effort t ttE K  represents the proportion of 
the existing capital that is engaged in harvesting. Given this, the harvest in the fishery is 
t t t th qx K  where q is the catchability coefficient (Schaefer, 1957). We specify the total cost 
of harvesting in the present period t as    , tt t tW x h ch qx  where c  is the cost per unit of 
fishing effort. Since we specify a long-run model of the fishery, we assume all costs are 
variable. However a limitation of this approach is that we cannot distinguish between effort 
levels Et that are driven by the capital stock tK  and those which are mostly due to the 
capacity utilisation ratio t , and the different implications these situations have for the total 
cost of fishing effort. Our  total cost function assumes constant returns to scale (i.e. 0
th
W   
and 0
t th h
W  ), so that the marginal harvesting cost (  tc qx ) is unchanged by the harvest th . 
It also captures the stock externality effect via an increase in the marginal harvesting cost at 
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lower biomass levels (i.e. 
 
0
t
td c
dx
qx

   ). Substituting the total cost of harvesting at time t, 
 ,t tW x h , and the harvest, t t t th qx K , into Equation (3.3) gives the expected net present value 
of a unit of investment at time t: 
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This specification of the expected net present value of a unit of investment at time t is 
distinguished from that given at Equation (2.10) in Chapter 2 by the assumption that the 
capacity utilisation ratio t  is both known and accounted for by fishers at the time of 
investment. Since the model in the current chapter is a static model, with a static level of 
capacity utilisation, we assume the sustained level of capacity utilisation will be recognised 
by fishers at the time of their investment (in the same way as the biomass is known at this 
time). In contrast, the omission of t  from Equation (2.10) is equivalent to assuming that it is 
one, i.e. the fishers who are entering the fishery at a given time expect that their capital, at 
least, will operate at its capacity. 
In the race to fish fishery, the capacity utilisation ratio will be at full capacity ( 1t  ) when 
the net revenue from harvesting is positive (i.e. 0
t t t t t
pqx K c K   ) or equivalently, from 
Equation (3.4) above, whenever 0t  . Substituting 1t   into Equation (3.4), the biomass 
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of the fishery when the investment in capital has ceased (i.e. when t Ic  ) can be found as 
 * . I
t
c c
x
pq
  
 . The biomass is stable at this point (i.e. 
1t t
x x

 ) so that the equilibrium 
condition 1 tt
t
qE
x x
z r
 
  
 
 applies, where the level of fishing effort t t tE K . As stated above, 
the capacity utilisation ratio 1t  , so that t tE K  and the level of capital 
*K  that exists 
when investment has ceased is: 
 
   * 2
.
.t I
z r
K pqx c c
pq x
       
(3.5) 
 
In our model, the change in capital occurs instantaneously, via a ‘pulse’ of investment 
t
I , so 
that 
*
1tK K  . Given the standard capital dynamics, 1t t t tK K IK   , Equation (3.5), and 
the investment process discussed at the beginning of this section, a full specification of the 
investment rule in our model, with quasi non-malleable capital, is shown below: 
 
   2
.
.
0
t
I t t
t I
t t t I
t I
z r
pqx c c K K
cpq x
I K c
c
  

 



      

 
 


 
 
(3.6) 
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3.2.3 Excess capacity in race to fish fisheries 
As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, excess capacity is defined as any situation in 
which the capacity utilisation ratio, t , is less than one. In race to fish fisheries, fishers will 
operate their capital up to the point at which the gains from harvesting have been exhausted, 
i.e. where the net revenue from harvesting 0t t t t tpqx K c K   . Given the average return to a 
unit of investment t  in Equation (3.4), the net revenue from harvesting will be zero when 
0t  , at which point we denote 
ˆ
t t  . The capacity utilisation ratio has an upper bound at 
1
t
  , which corresponds to full capacity utilisation, so that the level of t  can be formalised 
as: 
 
 min 1, tt   (3.7) 
Given Equations (3.4) and (3.7), the analytical expression for t  is shown below (a full 
derivation is in the appendix to this essay). 
 
 
 
 
2
2
2
1
.
. .
0
.
t
t
t
t t
t
t
pq xK
z
r pqx c
z r pqx c pq xK
z
pq xK r pqx c




 
  
 
 
 
(3.8) 
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The analytical expression in Equation (3.8) is for a given level of the capital stock tK . The 
capital stock tK  is an endogenous variable that is determined by fishers’ investment 
decisions, which in turn are influenced by the environmental variation capture in by variable 
tz . However, for a given level of tK  the two cases of Equation (3.8) show a threshold level 
of environmental variation beyond which capacity is at least temporarily fully utilised in the 
fishery (i.e. 
 
2
.
t
t
pq xK
z
r pqx c


). This threshold will be low for species where either the intrinsic 
growth rate (r) or the environmental carrying capacity ( x ) are high, and also in cases where 
the price of fish (p) is high. The threshold will be high when the cost per unit of fishing 
effort (c) is high. In the case of the catchability coefficient q, the threshold decreases as q 
increases up until 2q c px , after which the threshold increases as q increases. 
 
3.3 Results 
The central aim of this essay is to investigate the link between excess capacity and 
environmental variation in a fishery where the race to fish and the race to invest are 
prominent, and in which capital is non-malleable. In achieving this aim, we first analyse 
transitory environmental variations in the fishery with both perfectly non-malleable 
capital (i.e. 0tI   and 0  ), and quasi non-malleable capital ( 0tI   and 0  ). We then 
use parameterised simulations of our model to investigate the response of excess capacity to 
both regular cyclical fluctuations in recruitment as well as permanent ‘regime shifts’ which 
cause changes in the ‘normal’ level of recruitment in the fishery. As a baseline for our 
53 
 
analyses we assume an initial state in which recruitment is at its ‘normal’ level (i.e. 1tz  ) 
and there is a single vessel harvesting from the resource (i.e. 0 1K  ). 
 
3.3.1 Transient environmental variation and excess capacity 
3.3.1.1 Perfectly non-malleable capital 
A diagram showing the possible states of the fishery with perfectly non-malleable capital is 
presented in Figure 3.2, where the values of the state variables tK  and tz  are represented by 
the vertical and horizontal axes, respectively. The extent of environmental variation is 
bounded between the maximum and minimum values, maxz  and 
minz , as indicated  on the 
horizontal axis by the dashed vertical lines. 
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Figure 3.2: The adjustment of the fishery between static equilibria when capital is perfectly 
non-malleable 
 
 
For the combinations of capital and environmental variation above the curve labelled t Ic   
in Figure 3.2 the expected net present value of investment t  is less than the purchase price 
of capital 
I
c  and the capital stock is stable due to it being perfectly non-malleable. By 
contrast, for the combinations of tK  and tz  below t Ic   the capital stock increases because 
the expected net present value of investment exceeds the purchase price of capital, t Ic  . In 
this case a pulse of investment in the capital stock will occur instantaneously which brings 
the fishery on to the curve t Ic  , as described in Equation (3.5). This investment is 
illustrated by the vertical arrow below the curve t Ic  . 
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The extent of excess capacity in Figure 3.2 is identified by the dashed rays that extend from 
the origin, and along which the variables tK  and tz  give the same value of the capacity 
utilisation ratio ϕt. Rays which lie above the ray 1t   identify values of capacity utilisation 
1t  . All combinations of tK  and tz  below the ray 1t  , in the shaded area of Figure 3.2, 
are associated with the full utilisation of existing capacity, i.e. no excess capacity in the 
fishery.  
The adjustment process for the case of a positive fluctuation in the recruitment of the fishery 
is illustrated by the path B C D E in Figure 3.2. Beginning from point B, where t Ic  , a 
subsequent positive recruitment fluctuation moves the fishery to C, where there is further 
investment that takes the fishery to D as shown in Equation (3.5). When environmental 
conditions return to ‘normal’ (i.e. 1tz  ) the fishery transitions  to the point E, which marks 
the end of the fishery’s adjustment to equilibrium. This equilibrium is characterised by excess 
capacity ( 1t  ) which will persist in the absence of further environmental changes. 
Again starting at the point B, the adjustment of the fishery in response to a negative 
recruitment fluctuation is shown in Figure 3.2 by the path B F B. The negative fluctuation in 
recruitment initially shifts the fishery leftwards to the point F, which is on a higher ray along 
which 1t   and there is thus excess capacity. When the recruitment returns to ‘normal’ (i.e. 
1
t
z  ) the fishery then moves back to full capacity utilisation at point B. Thus a negative 
recruitment fluctuation in the open access fishery with perfectly non-malleable capital will 
cause temporary excess capacity, but will not lead to permanent excess capacity. 
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3.3.1.2 Quasi non-malleable capital  
Figure 3.3 presents a diagram showing the case of the fishery with a quasi non-malleable 
capital stock, similar to that discussed previously in the case of perfectly non-malleable 
capital. However in this case, when the fishery is at a point above the t Ic   curve the fishers 
allow their existing capital to depreciate at the rate γ > 0 as shown by the downward arrow in 
Figure 3.3 above the t Ic   curve. 
 
Figure 3.3: The adjustment of the fishery between static equilibria when capital is quasi 
non-malleable 
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The fishery’s response to a positive fluctuation in environmental conditions is shown by the 
path B C D E B in Figure 3.3. Starting from the initial point B, a positive fluctuation in 
recruitment moves the fishery out to point C, where there is a further burst of investment to 
point D. When the recruitment returns to normal (i.e. 1tz  ) the fishery transitions from D to 
E, where the capacity utilisation ratio 1t   and there is thus excess capacity. The quasi non-
malleable capital then depreciates and the system returns to the point B, where there is no 
excess capacity. 
The fishery’s response to a negative recruitment fluctuation is also shown in Figure 3.3 by the 
loop B F G H B. Again, starting from point B, the fishery initially moves to point F in 
response to the negative fluctuation in recruitment, and this is located on a ray for which 
1t   (i.e. excess capacity). Since the point F is above the curve t Ic  , which denotes 
stable levels of the capital stock, the fishers will allow capital to depreciate and the fishery 
will move to the point G. When tz  returns to normal ( 1tz  ), the fishery then transitions to 
point H, where the expected net present value of investment t Ic   (i.e. below the t Ic   
curve). Consequently there is a burst of investment at H which returns the fishery to point B. 
In the case of transient fluctuations in environmental conditions, the fishery with quasi 
non-malleable capital can experience temporary excess capacity as the capital stock adjusts 
up or down in response to positive or negative variations in recruitment. Excess capacity in 
this case is a feature of the adjustment in fishing capacity as the system moves from one level 
of recruitment to another, and in the absence of further recruitment fluctuations presents only 
a temporary phenomenon. 
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3.3.2 Simulating excess capacity in the open access fishery with quasi non-malleable 
capital 
In this subsection we investigate the development of excess capacity in response to 
fluctuations in the environmental conditions for an open access fishery with a quasi 
non-malleable capital stock. In particular, we simulate the evolution of the capital stock tK  
and the capacity utilisation ratio ϕt for three scenarios that describe the variation in 
recruitment of the fishery. Using a vector of environmental variation 
1 2, ,...,zTz z z  we 
present simulation results that examine: i) regular fluctuations in recruitment that coincide 
with a cyclical variation in environmental conditions; ii) positive ‘regime shifts’ in which the 
fishery’s recruitment permanently increases; and iii) negative ‘regime shifts’ in which the 
fishery’s recruitment permanently decreases.  
Benchmark parameter values for our simulations are shown in Table 3.1.
4
 The values for p, q, 
c, r and x  are from Bjørndal and Conrad (1987), and the remaining parameters Ic  and   
were obtained from Singh et al. (2006). We set the capital depreciation rate γ = 0.05. All 
simulations in this subsection are for 100 periods and assume an initial capital stock 0 1K   , 
where the capital stock is measured in standard vessel units, and initial recruitment 
fluctuation of 1tz   (i.e. recruitment is at its ‘normal’ level). In our simulations, each period 
                                                 
4
 All currencies are measured in United States dollars. Figures in Norwegian Kroner for the North Sea Herring 
were converted at a rate of 7.1429 Kroner to 1 United States dollar (University of British Columbia PACIFIC 
Exchange Rate Service, http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/etc/USDpages.pdf). 
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represents a length of time that is sufficient to achieve stability in the biomass, and as such 
our analysis represents a comparison of the fishery at bioeconomic equilibria across time. 
 
Table 3.1: Model parameterisation 
   Parameter Value Description 
p  67.07 Price per tonne ($) 
q  6.77 × 10-4 Catchability coefficient 
c  38895 Cost per unit of fishing effort ($)  
  0.048 Time discount rate 
r  0.800 Intrinsic growth rate 
x  3200000 Environmental carrying capacity (tonnes) 
Ic  236500 Purchase price of capital ($) 
Note: The unit price of fish p in this essay is the average price, in U.S. Dollars, of North Sea Herring from 1963 
to 1977 in the sample of Bjørndal and Conrad (1987). This contrasts with the unit price of fish in Chapter 2, 
which was for a specific year. 
 
3.3.2.1 Cyclical fluctuations 
Figure 3.4 shows the behaviour of the capital stock tK  and the capacity utilisation ratio t  
when environmental variation causes the recruitment to the fishery to cycle around a long run 
‘normal’ level (at which 1tz  ). 
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Figure 3.4: Cyclical fluctuation in recruitment 
(a) 10.0 percent increase and decrease in recruitment for a depreciation rate 0.05   
 
 
(b) 60.0 percent increase and decrease in recruitment for a depreciation rate 0.05   
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(c) 60.0 percent increase and decrease in recruitment for a depreciation rate 0.15   
 
 
Panel (a) of Figure 3.4 shows the behaviour of the capital stock and the capacity utilisation 
ratio for a cycle in recruitment of ±10.0 percent above and below the ‘normal’ level; and 
Panel (b) shows the same fishery with a ±60.0 percent cycle in recruitment. In both cases 
there is a regular process of investment and depreciation that occurs as the fishers capitalise 
the increased net revenue from harvesting that occurs during episodes of high recruitment, 
and then allow their capital to depreciate when recruitment decreases. When the magnitude of 
the environmental variation is sufficiently large, periodic episodes of excess capacity also 
result from the cycle in recruitment. This is shown in Panel (b), where the capacity utilisation 
ratio ϕt falls below 40.0 percent during the negative phase of the cycle (i.e. 1tz   ).  
The pro-cyclical fluctuations in tK  are also larger when the environmental variation is 
higher. In Panel (b) the capital stock varies by approximately 44.0 percent in response to the 
recruitment fluctuations, where this is only around 20.0 percent in Panel (a). The comparison 
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of these two panels also demonstrates a relationship between the average size of the capital 
stock and the magnitude of the environmental variation. In particular, the average capital 
stock is higher when the variation in environmental conditions is larger. In Panel (a) the 
average capital stock during the recruitment fluctuations is 677 standard vessel units, whereas 
in Panel (b) this is around 934 standard vessel units. The increase in the expected net present 
value of investment ( t ) during an episode of strong, environmentally driven recruitment is 
greater, and more capital is therefore purchased during the positive recruitment fluctuations 
(so that the average capital stock is higher when environmental variation is higher). 
Panel (c) of Figure 3.4 shows the effect of the malleability of capital on the level of excess 
capacity. For an increased malleability of capital, as captured by a higher rate of 
depreciation (γ = 0.15), the results in Panel (c) suggest a link between the malleability of 
capital and the extent of excess capacity. As the rate of depreciation increases, the expected 
net present value of a unit of investment t  decreases, so that less capital is purchased during 
favourable environmental conditions, and there is consequently a lower average level of 
capital in the fishery in Panel (c). The reduction in the capital stock during less favourable 
conditions is also greater when the depreciation of capital is higher, and as a consequence the 
size of the pro-cyclical fluctuations in tK  are greater in Panel (c) than in Panel (b). Therefore 
when the capital is more malleable, as denoted by a faster rate of depreciation, periods of 
excess capacity are less severe and the cycle of capacity utilisation is characterised by longer 
periods of full capacity ( 1t  ). 
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3.3.2.2 Regime shifts 
In Figure 3.5 we present results for positive and negative regime shifts in the fishery with 
quasi non-malleable capital. These regime shifts cause the recruitment of the fishery to 
change abruptly, and for a prolonged period of time, to higher and lower levels respectively 
(Möllmann and Diekmann, 2012, Ling et al., 2015, Miller et al., 1994, Hare and Francis, 
1995). In our simulations, these regime shifts begin in period 30, as indicated by the solid 
vertical line in each of the panels of Figure 3.5, and represent a change in the fishery’s 
recruitment of ±60.0 percent. 
 
Figure 3.5: Regime shift resulting in an increase and decrease in recruitment 
(a) Sudden increase to a new regime 
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(b) Sudden decrease to a new regime 
 
 
The fishery’s response to a positive regime shift is shown above in Panel (a) of Figure 3.5. 
This increase in recruitment causes the capital stock to increase, as fishers capitalise the gain 
in net harvesting revenue that occurs as a result of the higher abundance of fish. The higher 
level of production from the fishery also requires full capacity utilisation (i.e. 1t  ), so that 
there is no excess capacity in response to positive regime shift. The fishery’s response to a 
negative regime shift is shown in Panel (b) of Figure 3.5, which shows an abrupt drop in the 
recruitment of the fishery to a new lower level. In this case, the capital stock decreases as the 
fishers cease replacing depreciated capital to compensate for a reduction in net harvesting 
revenue (at the lower recruitment), and this adjustment results in a large episode of excess 
capacity ( 1t  ). In this case excess capacity is a temporary feature of the fishery, and is 
associated with the downward adjustment of the capital stock. The lower level of recruitment 
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is concomitant with a lower harvest in the fishery, and this requires less capital stock. 
Changes in the harvest occur rapidly, but the adjustment of the capital stock requires a longer 
time since it occurs through the depreciation of capital. This creates a mismatch between the 
harvest and fishing capacity that is reflected in the level of excess capacity. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
Excess capacity is often understood as a transitional feature of the fishery that is associated 
with the inability of the capital stock to adjust to fluctuations in economic and environmental 
conditions (Ward et al., 2005, Squires et al., 2003). However, in some circumstances the race 
to fish and race to invest can lead to persistent levels of excess capacity that result in 
economic waste in the form of underutilised capacity (Clark and Munro, 2002, Gréboval and 
Munro, 1999). Effective responses to such economic waste continue to elude fisheries 
managers and researchers alike (OECD, 2009, Salayo et al., 2008). An important step in 
developing better management practices for fisheries, which improve the allocation of scarce 
resources and reduce economic waste, can be made through a greater understanding of the 
drivers of wasteful excess capacity. 
It has long been understood that deterministic models can give poor guidance on fisheries 
management decisions when environmental conditions fluctuate over time (Hannesson, 1987). 
In a theoretical model of the sole-owner fishery Charles (1983) and Charles and Munro (1985) 
show that the capital stock fluctuates over a broad range under stochastic assumptions. By 
way of comparison with our model, Panels (b) and (c) of Figure 3.4 indicate that this may 
also true of the pure open access fishery with environmental variation. Charles (1985) finds 
that the capital stock in a sole-owner fishery decreases with higher rates of depreciation on 
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capital, and this also seems to be the case for the pure open access fishery, again by a 
comparison of Panels (b) and (c) of Figure 3.4. While these observations reveal some 
parallels between the change in the capital stock that occurs due to environmental variation in 
models of the sole-owner fishery, and the behaviour of capital in our model of the pure open 
access fishery with environmental variation, it is important to note that the sole-owner fishery 
represents optimal behaviour and is not directly comparable to the pure open access fishery, 
where the capital stock is a culmination of decisions that are motivated by an inefficient race 
to invest. 
In this essay we explore the link between environmental variation and excess capacity using a 
bioeconomic model of the open access fishery in which myopic fishers invest up to the point 
at which they expect the expected net present value of a unit of investment to be equal to the 
purchase price of capital. The fishers’ harvesting decision is modelled separately from their 
investment decision, and this is captured through the proportional utilisation of the current 
capacity. In our model we consider both perfectly non-malleable capital and quasi 
non-malleable capital (Clark et al., 1979), which represent degrees of adjustability of the 
capital stock. We investigate three types of environmental variation, which are: transient 
fluctuations, regular cyclical fluctuations and permanent regime shifts in which the fishery’s 
recruitment moves from one level to another. These represent fluctuations in the recruitment 
of the fishery that result from changes in the physical environment. 
Our results confirm a relationship between environmental variation, investment and excess 
capacity. In the fishery with perfectly non-malleable capital, when there is a transient positive 
fluctuation in recruitment the myopic fishers accumulate additional capital that will expand 
the fishery’s capacity. When the fishing conditions return to ‘normal’ levels, this newly 
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acquired capital represents excess capacity. This process of capacity accumulation is 
consistent with the description of ‘Ludwig’s ratchet’ (Ludwig et al., 1993, Pitcher, 2001, 
Pinnegar and Engelhard, 2008). In Ludwig’s ratchet, fishers who purchase capital when the 
recruitment is high subsequently pressure authorities to provide subsidies that sustain the 
harvest when the fishing conditions return to ‘normal’. In the context of our model, such 
subsidies would encourage the utilisation of capacity by increasing the net revenue from 
harvesting. The resulting increase in the capacity utilisation ratio in turn causes an escalation 
of harvesting, which reduces the biomass of the fishery. Subsequent fluctuations in 
recruitment cause further ‘ratcheting’ down of the biomass, and potentially lead to the 
collapse of the fishery. In our model, for the case of quasi non-malleable capital, the new 
capacity acquired during positive recruitment fluctuations disappears over time due to the 
depreciation of capital. Consequently the increase in harvesting that occurs because of the 
higher capacity utilisation ratio diminishes over time, so that the fishery partially or 
completely self-corrects for the ratchet effect. 
In the open access fishery with quasi non-malleable capital, our results also suggest that 
regular cyclical fluctuations in recruitment can lead to excess capacity. When fluctuations are 
of sufficient magnitude, periodic episodes of excess capacity will transpire during the 
negative phases of the recruitment cycle. Reductions in recruitment also generate excess 
capacity in the case of transient negative fluctuations as well as in the case of negative regime 
shifts. In the latter of these cases a permanent decrease in recruitment of the fishery leads to a 
protracted episode of excess capacity.  
For all types of environmental variation explored in this essay, we find that the level of 
excess capacity is determined by the size of the environmental variation relative to the rate of 
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capital depreciation, or the level of capital malleability. A negative change in recruitment 
reduces the sustainable harvest of the fishery, which necessitates a reduction in the capital 
stock. While the harvest adjusts quickly through the utilisation of current capacity, the quasi 
non-malleable capital changes more gradually through the depreciation of capital and this 
disparity leads to a high level of excess capacity. As the rate of depreciation increases, which 
is to say that capital becomes more malleable, the episodes of excess capacity are smaller and 
of less duration. In contrast to negative changes in recruitment, positive regime shifts, which 
increase the level of recruitment in the fishery, do not cause excess capacity. The increase in 
recruitment increases the sustainable harvest of the fishery which leads to investment, but 
does not generate excess capacity since the newly acquired capital is appropriate for the new 
recruitment of the fishery after the regime shift. 
In this essay we have shown how excess capacity can arise in the context of race to fish and 
race to invest behaviour, as a result of environmental variation and non-malleable capital. 
Despite much progress in fisheries management world-wide, the race to fish continues to be a 
hallmark of common-pool resource use, even in cases where catch and effort are regulated, or 
where catch shares are assigned. Our focus in this essay on racing behaviour in terms of 
fisher’s investment and on environmental variation is both novel and increasingly important 
as climate change generates the potential for no-analog variations in oceanic conditions and 
fish recruitment (Möllmann and Diekmann, 2012, Lehodey et al., 2006).  
Our results demonstrate a complex relationship between environmental variation and excess 
capacity. We find the levels of excess capacity which occur in the fishery due to 
environmental variation are transitory, in that they are self-correcting over time, when capital 
is malleable. However, we also find that the significance of excess capacity depends critically 
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on the type fluctuation in environmental conditions. In the case of negative fluctuations, 
where the recruitment of the fishery decreases, we find that the transitory effect is short term 
and generates no change in the capital stock. In the case of positive fluctuations, however, the 
increase in the sustainable harvest of the fishery generates wasteful investments in capital that 
also contribute to rent dissipation in the fishery. When regular cyclical fluctuations occur 
over time, we find that the periodic increases in recruitment are associated with transitory 
economic waste, in the form of inefficient capital investments that are depreciated away over 
time. 
Our results show that, in the presence of environmental variability, the malleability of the 
capital stock is a key determinant of the level of excess capacity in race to fish fisheries. 
When the capital stock is highly non-malleable, any increase in capacity will remain in the 
fishery for a long period of time giving rise to a prolonged period of excess capacity. While 
measures designed to address excess capacity in fisheries should focus on containing race 
behaviours, our analysis indicates that the malleability of capital is also an important 
determinant of the duration and amount of excess capacity. Our specification of the 
malleability of capital has been in terms of the rate of depreciation, however the ease with 
which capital can be transferred between fisheries and also between fishing and non-fishing 
applications is also an important source of adjustability in the capital stock. The relationship 
between these factors and the malleability of the capital stock is complex (Salayo et al., 2008, 
Grafton et al., 1996), and better understanding this relationship is an important area for future 
research. In addition, the analysis of environmental variation in this essay has been 
undertaken in a deterministic model by analysing pre-determined fluctuations in recruitment, 
and a second useful avenue for further research may be to extend our analysis to a stochastic 
specification of recruitment. 
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Appendix: The capacity utilisation ratio t  
This appendix sets out the derivation of the values of t  shown in Equation (3.8) of the main 
body of this essay, given the definition of t  shown in Equation (3.4). The capacity 
utilisation ratio t  is bounded above and below by 1 and 0, respectively, so that it takes the 
form: 
 
 min 1, tt   (A.1) 
 
where 
ˆ
t
  represents the point of simultaneous stability in the biological and economic 
systems (i.e. where the net revenue from harvesting has been exhausted) and occurs where 
the expected net present value of a unit of investment t  is equal to zero. Given the 
definition of t  from Equation (3.4) and the condition from the Gordon-Schaefer model that 
   . . 1t tt t ttz zh G rxx x x  , i.e. the harvest during any period is equal to the recruitment 
of the fish population during that time, the derivation of 
ˆ
t
  is shown below in 
steps (A.2)-(A.5): 
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From step (A.5) it is clear that 1t   when 
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, so that the analytical expression 
for t , as shown at Equation (3.8) of the main text, is: 
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Chapter 4. Excess Capacity and Efficiency in the 
Post-ITQ Fishery: The Case of the Tasmanian Rock 
Lobster Fishery  
 
4.1 Introduction 
Controlling the emergence of new, and managing existing, fishing capacity is of major 
concern to fisheries regulators and policymakers worldwide (OECD, 2009, FAO, 2008, FAO, 
1999, Pomeroy, 2012). Fishing capacity refers to the technical ability of a vessel or fishing 
fleet to harvest fish, under normal or customary operating conditions (Pascoe et al., 2003, 
Kirkley and Squires, 1999, Johansen, 1968). In terms of the overall fishery, excess capacity 
occurs when the fishing capacity exceeds the level of harvest that is observed from the 
fishing fleet, and this represents ‘pure’ economic waste in the sense that the total harvest 
could have been taken with a smaller or less technically advanced fishing fleet (Salayo et al., 
2008, Clark and Munro, 2002, Gréboval and Munro, 1999). Such waste not only raises the 
potential for the spill-over of fishing effort between fisheries, but also signals opportunities 
for the improvement of the fishery’s performance. 
The development of excess capacity is well understood in fisheries where there are incentives 
for race to fish and race to invest behaviour by the fishery’s participants. For example, excess 
capacity is a long standing issue in limited entry fisheries, where it arises through a process 
termed ‘capital stuffing.’ Capital stuffing describes the gradual increase in fishing capacity 
that occurs in limited entry fisheries as fishers invest in better gear and larger vessels in order 
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to gain greater harvests from the fishery (Townsend, 1985). In fisheries where a manager 
attempts to control the global harvest by restricting the season length (Homans and Wilen, 
1997), excess capacity arises as fishers compete for a greater share of the manager’s target 
harvest (Munro and Clark, 2003). In unregulated fisheries, where the incentives for such race 
behaviour are all-pervasive, the analysis in the first two essays of this thesis has shown how 
the non-malleability of capital and environmental variation, both of which are common 
features of world fisheries, contribute to the development of excess capacity. 
It is commonly argued that the implementation of an ITQ system can eliminate the race to 
fish and improve both biological and economic outcomes for the fishery (Grafton et al., 2006, 
Costello et al., 2008, Branch, 2009). An ITQ system firstly establishes a Total Allowable 
Catch (TAC) control that limits the fishery’s harvest, and then creates a set number of 
transferable rights to the TAC that can be traded between the fishery’s participants. Although 
contentious in the literature, it is often argued that the trade in these rights will encourage the 
transfer of fishing effort from less efficient to more efficient fishers (Österblom et al., 2011, 
Grafton, 1996, McCay, 1996). The reduction in vessel numbers that occurs as the less 
efficient fishers are excluded from the fishery also has the potential to reduce or eliminate 
levels of excess capacity. Since the total harvest of the fishery is shared among fewer vessels, 
the production of the most efficient vessels may approach their fishing capacity and thereby 
reduce excess capacity. The reduction in vessel numbers, and therefore the decline in excess 
capacity, can occur quickly, or may be drawn out over a number of years, depending on the 
availability of alternatives for the incumbent fishers (Grafton et al., 1996, Squires and Kirkley, 
1991, Vestergaard et al., 2005).  
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The success of ITQ systems at eliminating the race to fish depends on a number of specific 
factors, which include effective governance (Hanna, 1999); a strong monitoring, control and 
surveillance system (Parslow, 2010); and critically on implementing a binding TAC 
constraint (Kompas et al., 2009, Grafton et al., 2007, Kompas and Gooday, 2007). When the 
TAC is non-binding, the fishery can revert to a regulated open access or limited entry 
paradigm (Emery et al., 2014, Kompas et al., 2009, Grafton et al., 2007, Kompas and Gooday, 
2007) in which the incentives for race behaviour are well known and lead to an increase in 
fishing effort (Emery et al., 2014, Kompas et al., 2009). Periods of non-binding TAC have 
been observed in the northern zone of the South Australian rock lobster fishery (Linnane et 
al., 2010, McWhinnie and Otumawu-Apreku, 2013), the Australian south eastern trawl 
fishery (Elliston et al., 2004, Kompas and Gooday, 2007), and also in the Tasmanian rock 
lobster fishery (Emery et al., 2014). Studies of these fisheries overwhelmingly find an 
increase in fishing effort due to the non-binding TAC and, in some cases, a decline in the 
total value of the harvest (Elliston et al., 2004, Kompas and Gooday, 2007). 
In the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery, Emery et al. (2014) find a period of non-binding TAC 
is associated with an increase in the temporal concentration of fishing effort (i.e. pot lifts), 
and also observe a drop in the lease price of quota over this period. There are many 
non-fishing quota owners in this fishery who lease units at the prevailing market price to 
‘rental’ fishers that harvest from the resource (van Putten et al., 2011, van Putten and Gardner, 
2010). When the TAC is non-binding, the drop in the rental price of quota allows the re-entry 
of latent vessels (Emery et al., 2014) that are operated by fishers who cannot harvest or 
harvest as much at the market clearing prices. Using the Adjusted Gini coefficient and the 
Normalised Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, Emery et al. (2014) find a concentration of fishing 
effort in the first two weeks of November in quota years where the TAC was non-binding. In 
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this essay, we investigate the same quota years for evidence of race behaviour in the fishery 
by directly examining the levels of excess capacity and efficiency in the fishery over this 
period. 
In general, a small number of studies have compared excess capacity before and after the 
introduction of an ITQ system. These studies tend to find evidence of only a small reduction 
in excess capacity following the introduction of such systems (Dupont et al., 2002, Solís et al., 
2014b), although some studies do find a more significant change in capacity utilisation. For 
instance, Squires et al. (2010) investigate excess capacity before and after the introduction of 
an ITQ system, and find evidence to support the ability of such systems to deliver reductions 
in excess capacity over a longer time period. To the best of our knowledge, however, there 
has been no study that directly investigates the temporal (i.e. dynamic) behaviour of excess 
capacity and efficiency in a post-ITQ fishery; nor is there any economic investigation of 
changes in excess capacity and efficiency during a period of non-binding TAC in such a 
fishery. 
In this essay, we use a census of compulsory logbook data for the Tasmanian rock lobster 
fishery (an Australian fishery) from January 2000 to December 2013 to derive empirical 
estimates of excess capacity and efficiency in that fishery over time. The Tasmanian rock 
lobster fishery has been ITQ-managed since the 1998 quota year (Hartmann et al., 2013), and 
from the 2008 to the 2010 quota years the TAC in the rock lobster fishery was 
non-binding (Emery et al., 2014, Hartmann et al., 2013). We derive estimates of excess 
capacity and efficiency in the fishery for the 2000 to the 2013 quota years using the Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method. In this essay we define excess capacity as occurring 
when the unbiased capacity utilisation ratio is less than one. The unbiased capacity utilisation 
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ratio removes a bias that is present in conventional capacity utilisation measures by 
accounting for differences in technical efficiency that occur between vessels (Kirkley et al., 
2002). Our empirical estimates enable us to explore the relationship between excess capacity 
and the race for fish by investigating whether the adjustment of the fishery continues over a 
long period of time after the lessening of race behaviour following the introduction of the 
ITQ, which may indicate that the ITQ system has a larger effect on excess capacity than is 
suggested by most previous empirical studies; and whether the re-emergence of race to fish 
behaviour during a period of non-binding TAC in the fishery can be observed in the pattern 
of excess capacity and efficiency. 
 
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Defining and measuring capacity utilisation and technical efficiency 
In fisheries, capacity utilisation represents the proportion of a vessel’s capacity output that is 
utilised to produce the current level of output. The commonly accepted definition of capacity 
output is the maximum output that can be produced in a period of time, given normal or 
customary operating conditions, with existing plant and equipment and provided that the 
availability of variable factors is not restricted. Färe et al. (1989) define capacity utilisation as 
the ratio of the individual vessel’s actual output to the capacity output; however inefficiencies 
that are inherent to the usual operating conditions in the fishery may bias this measure. An 
unbiased measure of capacity utilisation can be estimated by calculating the ratio of the 
vessel’s technically efficient output to its capacity output (Kirkley et al., 2002). Technically 
efficient output refers to the maximum output that can be obtained from a given set of inputs 
when output is constrained by the availability of both the fixed and variable inputs. These 
77 
 
definitions of capacity utilisation, capacity output, and technically efficient output accord 
with the recommendations of the 1998 Technical Consultation on the Measurement of 
Fishing Capacity held by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 
and have been widely adopted by empirical analyses of excess capacity in fisheries (Dupont 
et al., 2002, Squires et al., 2010, Kirkley et al., 2002). 
We measure technically efficient and capacity output using the output orientated DEA 
approach. This method searches the available production data for convex combinations that 
generate the greatest output for a given level of fixed inputs (in the case of capacity output) or 
both fixed and variable inputs (in the case of technically efficient output). The alternative to 
measuring technically efficient and capacity output is termed input orientated DEA, and this 
method searches the production data for combinations of the data points that minimise the use 
of inputs for a given level of output. A practical issue arises with this approach in the case of 
capacity measurement, where the fixed inputs of the fishery are assumed to be static at the 
vessel level. The use of output-orientated DEA is more practical for capacity measurement, 
but also has the limitation that it assumes the output of individual vessels can be expanded for 
a given the set of vessel inputs (and this may not be the case for quota managed fisheries, 
where catch is controlled). 
4.2.1.1 Estimating capacity output 
Färe et al. (1989) distinguish between fixed and variable inputs, and measure the level of 
capacity output by assuming that the utilisation of variable inputs can be adjusted but that 
production is constrained by the availability of the fixed inputs. Consider observations for 
vessels j = 1…J  in a fishery producing output jY R  by using a vector of n = 1…N  inputs
j NX R . We make standard assumptions in relation to inputs and outputs, so that: the level 
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of production 0jY   for all j (i.e. every vessel in the fishery has undertaken some fishing 
activity); that 0
j
n
j
X   for each input n (i.e. each input is used by at least one vessel); and 
also 0jn
n
X   for all vessels j (i.e. each vessel uses at least one input). 
Under these standard assumptions, Färe et al. (1989) show that capacity output can be 
formalised as the solution to the Linear Optimisation Problem below: 
 
1
1
, ,
max
z 
  (4.1) 
 
subject to: 
1
j j j
j
Y z Y   (4.1.1) 
,  j j jn n
j
z X X n  K  (4.1.2) 
,  j j j jn n n
j
z X X n  V  (4.1.3) 
1j
j
z   (4.1.4) 
 
where 11    is an output-oriented measure of biased capacity utilisation, and this value is 
bounded between 0 and 1(since 1 1  ). The vector V represents the set of variable inputs to 
the production process, and the vector K  identifies the elements of n  which relate to fixed 
inputs of production. The intensity variables 0jz   for each vessel serve to construct the 
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production technology from convex combinations of the observed data points. The optimality 
conditions on these linear combinations of the production points are imposed by Constraints 
(4.1.1) and (4.1.2). Taken together, these constraints require the optimising algorithm to 
choose between members of the convex hull
1
 which use less fixed inputs than the current 
vessel (i.e. ,  
j j j
n n
j
z X X n  K ) and which produce at least a factor 1  times more output (i.e.
1
j j j
j
Y z Y   ). Constraint (4.1.3) requires the full utilisation of variable inputs with the jth 
vessel’s utilisation of the nth variable input 0jn    for all nV . Constraint (4.1.4) is 
included in the optimisation problem when the production technology exhibits variable 
returns to scale (Färe et al., 1989, Grosskopf, 1986). The capacity output for the vessel j is 
obtained by multiplying the variable θ1 by the vessel’s observed output 
jY , which is to say 
that we refer to the product 1
j jY  is the capacity output for vessel j. 
4.2.1.2 Estimating technically efficient output and technical efficiency 
The technically efficient level of output is the maximum observed level of output that is 
attained from a given set of inputs (Farrell, 1957, Coelli et al., 2005). Such technically 
efficient output can be measured from the Linear Optimisation Problem below: 
  
                                                 
1
 The convex hull is the topologically smallest convex set that contains the production data. 
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2
2
,
max
z
  (4.2) 
 
subject to: 
2
j j j
j
Y z Y   (4.2.1) 
,  j j jn n
j
z X X n   K V  (4.2.2) 
1j
j
z   (4.2.3) 
 
where all variables are as defined previously, 2 1  , and 21 [0,1]   is the output-orientated 
measure of the technical efficiency of vessel j, when production is constrained by the 
availability of both the fixed and variable inputs. As in the case of capacity output, 
Constraints (4.2.1) and (4.2.2) above impose the optimality conditions on the combination of 
production points given by the intensity variables jz  and Constraint (4.2.3) is required 
because of the possibility of variable returns to scale in the fishery’s production technology. 
The technically efficient output for the vessel j is calculated by multiplying the variable 2  
for that vessel by its observed output jY , which is to say, we refer to the product 2
j jY  as the 
technically efficient output for vessel j. 
4.2.1.3 Estimating unbiased capacity utilisation 
Calculation of unbiased capacity utilisation for the vessel j during the year t, 
j
tCU ,  is as 
shown below: 
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(4.3) 
 
where 1,
j
t  is the value of 1  obtained from solving the Linear Optimisation Problem (4.1) for 
vessel j using the production data for year t; and 2,
j
t  is the value of 2  obtained from the 
Linear Optimisation Problem (4.2) for vessel j similarly using production data for year t. The 
variable 
j
tY  is the observed output of vessel j in year t.  
4.2.2 Estimating scale efficiency 
Scale efficiency is a measure of efficiency loss that occurs due to a deviation from the 
technically optimal production scale for a variable returns to scale production 
technology (Coelli et al., 2005). Scale efficiency is typically measured as the distance 
between the technically efficient production point along the variable returns to scale (VRS) 
production frontier and the technically optimum production scale on the constant returns to 
scale (CRS) frontier (Balk, 2001, Iliyasu et al., 2014, Coelli et al., 2005, Favero and Papi, 
1995). The CRS production technology represents a boundary of the linear span of the 
production points over R  and is defined by the most productive points in the dataset. The 
vertical distance between the CRS and the VRS technologies represents the amount of output 
that is foregone due to the lower productivity at the current scale of operation (Coelli et al., 
2005). The scale efficiency of the j
th 
vessel during the year t, 
j
tSE , is shown below:  
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(4.4) 
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where 
2,
j
t  is the value of 2  obtained from the Linear Optimisation Problem (4.2) for vessel j 
using production data from year t; and ,
2,
CRS j
t   is the similarly obtained value for a CRS 
production technology. The CRS production technology is introduced to the Linear 
Optimisation Problem (4.2) by omitting Constraint (4.2.3), i.e. 1
j
j
z  .  
 
4.3 The Tasmanian rock lobster fishery and data 
4.3.1 The Tasmanian rock lobster fishery 
Fishing for southern rock lobster (Jasus Edwardsii) occurs in Tasmanian state waters, which 
encompass that part of the Exclusive Economic Zone up to three nautical miles from the 
coast of the Tasmania. Management of the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery occurs through a 
combination of both input and output controls. Entry to the fishery is limited by a licencing 
regime. In the 2013-14 fishing season there were 312 licenced operators (DPIPWE, 2015), 
however not all of these operators were active harvesters in the fishery. On average from the 
2009-10 fishing season to the 2011-12 fishing season there were 234 active vessels in the 
fishery (Hartmann et al., 2013). The commercial fishing season for the rock lobster runs from 
March to February each year, with a closure in place for the majority of the state in 
September, and for the whole state during October. The rock lobster fishery has been subject 
to an ITQ system, supplemented by size limits and gear restrictions, since the beginning of 
the 1998 quota year (Gardner, 2012). The gear limit was raised from 40 to 50 pots per vessel 
at the time the ITQ system was introduced. To account for geographical variation in the 
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fishery, a single TAC
2
 for the commercial fishery is set each year using a spatially-explicit 
model that divides the fishery into the eleven stock assessment areas shown below. 
 
Figure 4.1: Schematic boundaries of the stock assessment areas for the Tasmanian rock 
lobster fishery (adapted from Hartmann et al., 2013) 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Very recently, the introduction of an ‘east coast cap’ in the fishery has meant there is a separate catch control 
for the rock lobster populations along the east coast of Tasmania. For the period of the fishery investigated in 
this essay, however, there was no east coast cap, and therefore just a single TAC for the fishery. 
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Recruitment in the fishery primarily occurs through the settlement of larvae from the water 
column (Gardner, 2012), and is therefore unevenly distributed around the state. The 
recruitment to a particular area of the fishery depends on the ocean currents and the survival 
of the larvae. The productivity of the fishery also varies by region. In the 2011-12 fishing 
season (Hartmann et al., 2013) the stock assessment areas on the east coast (i.e. 1 to 4) 
attracted 39.3 percent of the total pot lifts. Stock assessment area 5, which surrounds King 
Island, attracted 22.5 percent of the total pot lifts; and the remaining stock assessments areas 
(i.e. 6 to 11), which are on the west coast, attracted 38.1 percent of the total pot lifts. In the 
same fishing season the west coast stock assessment areas were responsible for 45.2 percent 
of the total production of the fishery. Those on the east coast recorded 28.7 percent of the 
production and the stock assessment area surrounding King Island was responsible for 
26.1 percent. 
The fishery is harvested by both quota owners and lease fishers, who rent quota units in order 
to harvest from the fishery. All fishers must hold at least one quota unit in order to maintain 
their fishing licence, and need a minimum of fifteen units to go fishing. For lease fishers, the 
remaining fourteen units can be obtained from a decentralised market for quota (van Putten et 
al., 2011). Quota owners are not required to fish, and since the beginning of the system there 
has been a growing trend towards a fishery that is characterised by lease fishers who are 
supplied by a group of non-fishing quota investors (van Putten et al., 2011, van Putten and 
Gardner, 2010). Vessels in the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery do not participate in any 
significant way in any other fisheries, which suggests that the malleability of capital may be 
low in this fishery. 
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4.3.2 Fishery data 
The variables used for the analysis presented in this essay are shown in Table 4.1. The 
BIOMASS variable was obtained from data provided by the Institute for Marine and 
Antarctic Studies. The remaining variables (VESS_ID, AREA, YEAR, MONTH, CREW, 
POTLIFTS, WEIGHT and OVERALL_LENGTH) were obtained from a database of daily 
log-book records for the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery that is maintained by the Tasmanian 
Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water and the Environment. These log-book 
records represent a regular census of the fishery, and the log-book data have been made 
available for this study as monthly aggregates within the 2000 to 2013 fishing seasons.
3
 
 
Table 4.1: Definition of variables 
Variable name Description 
VESS_ID Vessel identification number in the dataset 
AREA Stock assessment area (1 to 11) 
YEAR Calendar year to which the catch relates 
MONTH Calendar month to which the catch relates 
CREW Number of crew on-board the vessel for the catch 
observation, including the skipper 
BIOMASS Rock lobster biomass from the stock assessment area to 
which the harvesting related (in tonnes) 
POTLIFTS Total number of pots lifted from the ocean during the 
month 
WEIGHT Weight of the rock lobster caught in the month (in tonnes) 
OVERALL_LENGTH Overall length of the vessel (in meters) 
 
                                                 
3
 Log books have been collected for earlier years of the fishery, however the data was not made available for the 
study in this essay. 
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While the majority of the variables in Table 4.1 were available for each month of the quota 
year from March to February, BIOMASS was recorded only on a seasonal basis. 
Consequently VESS_ID was used to aggregate the monthly observations of other variables 
within each quota year by fishing vessels. Prior to this aggregation the monthly vessel data 
were cleaned. Missing POTLIFTS records were filled using the most recent state-wide 
average pot lifts per unit of catch (Hartmann et al., 2013), and in one case a missing 
WEIGHT observation was replaced with a zero.
4
 The missing OVERALL_LENGTH 
observations were populated with the average value for the remainder of the dataset. CREW 
observations in excess of 12 members were also excluded, given the maximum length of a 
fishing vessel in the data (i.e. 29 meters), and the average number of crew per meter of length 
was used to assign the crew numbers to observations with positive fishing activity that 
recorded zero crew members. Of the remaining observations, those with missing values and 
those with a catch in excess of 6 kg per pot were also excluded (Gary Carlos, per. comm.). 
The monthly data were aggregated by vessel and quota year. This means that POTLIFTS 
represents the total number of pots lifted by a vessel during a quota year and WEIGHT 
represents the total weight of lobsters caught by that vessel during the quota year. The 
BIOMASS, OVERALL_LENGTH and CREW variables represent the average inputs for the 
vessel during the quota year. After aggregation and cleaning, the dataset consisted of 3120 
observations. The mean and standard deviation of the variables are reported below in 
Table 4.2.  
 
                                                 
4
 Since the POTLIFTS variable associated with this observation was also zero. 
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics for the dataset 
Variable 
 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Type of 
Variable CREW  1.79 0.58 Variable Input 
POTLIFTS 6118.70 3234.00 Variable Input 
WEIGHT  6.14  4.13 Output 
OVERALL_LENGTH 14.27 2.85 Fixed Input 
BIOMASS 442.40 185.50 Fixed Input 
 
Table 4.2 shows that, for the entire period from the 2000 to the 2013 quota years, the average 
length of a vessel in the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery is approximately 14 meters. This 
vessel is generally operated by one or two crew members (i.e. the skipper and a deck hand), 
lifts a total of 6118 pots during a quota year and harvests approximately 6.14 tonnes of 
lobsters. Given the areas in which the vessel operates, and the amount of fishing it does in 
each area, the average biomass input to production is 442.40 tonnes. These statistics account 
for variation between vessels within each quota year as well as across time, i.e. from one 
quota year to the next, and therefore represent the average vessel that has harvested the 
fishery from the 2000 quota year to the 2013 quota year. 
The fourth column in Table 4.2 identifies each of the variables as being a fixed input, a 
variable input or an output. The distinction between fixed and variable inputs is based on the 
ease with which they can be adjusted. Following Dupont et al. (2002) we classify the 
OVERALL_LENGTH of the vessel as a fixed input, represents the capital input to 
production. We also classify BIOMASS as a fixed input since it is largely out of the control 
88 
 
of the individual operators.
5
 The remaining variables CREW and POTLIFTS are variable 
inputs as these can be adjusted by the individual operators within a fishing season. The 
variable WEIGHT records the weight of the harvest of each vessel during each season, and 
represents the output of the production process. 
 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 TAC, harvest and the number of vessels 
The overarching aim of this essay is to investigate changes in excess capacity and efficiency 
in a post-ITQ period of the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery, and also whether the re-mergence 
of race behaviour can be observed in the excess capacity and efficiency scores when the TAC 
in that fishery is non-binding. To understand changes in the fishery over the study period we 
first report the total harvest, the average harvest, the biomass, the TAC and the number of 
active vessels in the fishery, and these are shown in Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 4.2 below.  
  
                                                 
5
 As described in section  4.3.1, there is some spatial variation in this fixed input and the vessel is able to move to 
different areas of the fishery. This means that vessels have some control over the biological input to production. 
However this is only possible in any given quota year within the bounds of the available concentrations of rock 
lobsters, and so we represent this variable as a fixed input. 
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Figure 4.2: The Tasmanian rock lobster fishery over the 2000 to 2013 quota years 
 (a) Total harvest, TAC and the biomass of the fishery 
 
 
(b) The number of vessels and the average harvest of each vessel 
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Panel (a) of Figure 4.2 shows the evolution of the biomass, harvest and TAC in the fishery. 
These three variables follow similar patterns over the study period, with the total biomass 
building steadily until around the 2005 quota year, where it begins to decline. This decline in 
the biomass eventually leads to reductions in the total harvest of the fishery, starting in the 
2008 quota year, and also in the TAC of the fishery beginning in the 2009 quota year. The 
biomass, harvest and TAC all stabilise in the 2011 quota year, and end the study period at 
76.2, 70.8, and 69.9 percent of their levels in the 2000 quota year respectively. Panel (a) also 
illustrates a period of non-binding TAC between the 2008 and 2010 quota years. During this 
time the proportion of TAC harvested by the fishery ranged between 89.6 and 95.0 percent. 
The total harvest of the fishery also declined from the 2008 to the 2010 quota years. 
Panel (b) of Figure 4.2 shows the number of vessels participating in the fishery and the 
average harvest per vessel. During the first eight years of the study period, from the 2000 
quota year to the 2007 quota year, the number of vessels operating in the fishery declined 
from 242 to 203 and the average harvest increased from 6.1 to 7.5 tons. This trend of 
decreasing participation in the fishery was reversed in the 2008 quota year when the TAC 
became non-binding, and a substantial drop in the price of quota encouraged latent vessels to 
re-enter the fishery (Emery et al., 2014). From the 2007 to the 2011 quota years the average 
harvest per vessel fell by 34.9 percent, and vessel numbers increased to near the level 
recorded in the 2000 quota year. By the 2013 quota year, the number of vessels had declined 
again to a low of 201 vessels (close to the level recorded in the 2007 quota year). The average 
harvest per vessel remained at about 5.0 tonnes or just 14.7 percent lower than at the 
beginning of the study period. It is also worth noting that, in the four years preceding the 
introduction of the ITQ system in 1998, there was an average of 334 vessels that actively 
harvested in the fishery (Hartmann et al., 2013). Directly after the introduction of the ITQ 
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system, this number of active vessels dropped to 286, and the decline continued throughout 
the 1999 and 2000 quota years. In terms of vessel numbers, therefore, the fishery’s 
adjustment occurred mostly from the 1998 to the 2000 quota years, which immediately 
followed the introduction of the ITQ system, and which do not form part of the study period 
for this essay. 
4.4.2 Capacity utilisation and efficiency in the fishery 
4.4.2.1 Unbiased capacity utilisation, technical efficiency and scale efficiency 
One of the main aims of this essay is to explore the evolution of excess capacity and 
efficiency in the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery over a period following the implementation 
of an ITQ system. We do this by observing and analysing the behaviour of the mean, median 
and interquartile range of unbiased capacity utilisation, shown in Panel (a) of Figure 4.3, and 
the same measures for technical and scale efficiency, shown in Panel (b) of Figure 4.3. The 
capacity output and technically efficient output are also reported in Panel (a) of Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3: Unbiased capacity utilisation, technical efficiency and scale efficiency 
(a) Unbiased capacity utilisation 
 
 
(b) Output-orientated technical and scale efficiency 
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As shown in Panel (a) of Figure 4.3, capacity utilisation in the fishery remained above 60.0 
percent for the entire study period. The mean capacity utilisation was 78.0 percent in the 
2000 quota year, and about 73.0 percent in the 2013 quota year. The mean capacity utilisation 
over the entire period was approximately 73.0 percent. These high levels of capacity 
utilisation indicate the most efficient vessels in the fishery cannot significantly increase their 
output by increasing the use of variable inputs, and point to a low level of economic waste in 
the fishery after the introduction of the ITQ system. Capacity utilisation has shown some 
variation over the study period, between a low of 63.0 percent in the 2005 quota year and a 
high of 79.0 percent in the 2011 quota year. As described in Equation (4.3), our measure of 
unbiased capacity utilisation represents the ratio of the technically efficient output to the 
capacity output for an individual vessel. Panel (a) of Figure 4.3 shows movements in the 
mean values of both these elements, which have declined over the study period by 2.3 and 2.5 
thousand tonnes, or 17.0 and 23.0 percent, respectively. This decline has not been monotonic, 
and in particular there was a spike in capacity output in the 2005 quota year that coincided 
with a fall in capacity utilisation. A similar spike in technically efficient output was not 
observed in the 2005 quota year. 
Panel (a) of Figure 4.3 also shows that the median capacity utilisation is always greater than 
the mean capacity utilisation, which suggests the presence of some vessels of very low 
capacity utilisation in the fishery’s data. With the exception of the 2011 quota year, the 
dispersion (i.e. the interquartile range) of the capacity utilisation remained mostly stable over 
the study period. In the 2011 quota year, the interquartile range contracted to 28.0 percentage 
points, compared with an average of 39.1 percentage points for the other quota years. This 
represents an increase in the homogeneity of the vessels in terms of their capacity utilisation, 
and possibly reflects a concentration of fishing effort among fewer harvesters. This could 
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have resulted from a rush to buy quota units when the TAC again became scarce at the 
beginning of the 2011 quota year. On the whole, our results indicate that the homogeneity of 
the active vessels in the fishery, with respect to capacity utilisation, has remained stable over 
the study period. In particular, the dispersion of capacity utilisation is unaffected by the 
non-binding TAC between the 2008 and the 2010 quota years. This suggests that latent 
vessels that re-entered the fishery over the period of non-binding TAC have either very low 
or very high capacity utilisation or represent a very small fraction of the total number of 
vessels in the fishery. 
Panel (b) of Figure 4.3 shows that there were modest changes in technical efficiency over the 
study period, with mean technical efficiency increasing from 60.0 to 64.0 percent. Mean 
technical efficiency varied substantially over the study period, ranging from a high of 68.0 
percent in the 2003 quota year to a low of 53.0 percent in the 2011 quota year. In particular, 
the fishery displayed a marked period of low technical efficiency from the 2009 to the 2011 
quota years. The scale efficiency of the fishery varied between 73.0 and 83.0 percent over the 
study period, but remained largely unchanged between the start of the period (when it was 
74.0 percent) and the end of the period (when it was 73.0 percent). Both technical efficiency 
and scale efficiency displayed four years of consecutive increase from the 2000 to 2004 quota 
years, not long after the introduction of the ITQ system. This may indicate that the fishery 
was operating at an inefficient scale (i.e. in a region of decreasing returns to scale) with low 
technical efficiency before the introduction of the ITQ system. Panel (b) of Figure 4.3 also 
shows that the mean values of scale efficiency were higher than those of technical efficiency 
throughout the study period. For the 2000 to the 2013 quota years the mean values of 
technical efficiency and of scale efficiency were around 60.0 and 80.0 percent respectively. 
This suggests that the fishers were operating at close to the technically optimal production 
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scale but were not technically efficient over the study period. This would indicate that the 
productivity of the fishery could be increased by improving the utilisation of variable inputs 
but not by changing the total use of fixed inputs. 
Panel (b) of Figure 4.3 also shows that the mean technical efficiency is consistently above the 
median technical efficiency, which suggests a number of highly efficient harvesters, possibly 
who know the better locations or times to fish for rock lobster (Madau et al., 2009). On the 
other hand, Panel (b) of Figure 4.3 shows that the mean scale efficiency is consistently below 
the median scale efficiency, which suggests a highly inefficient scale of operation among 
some vessels. Extreme values of scale inefficiency may reflect fishers who are unable to lease 
as many units of quota as they desire in the decentralised lease market. Also, the dispersion of 
scale efficiency appears to be lower at higher median values and higher at lower median 
values. The Pearson correlation coefficient between the median and the interquartile range of 
the scale efficiency is -0.7 (and is just 0.04 in the case of technical efficiency). This 
correlation might reflect differences in production technologies between vessels, so that a 
change in the fishery’ total harvest may have a disproportionately large impact on the scale 
efficiency of some vessels. Finally, the dispersions of both technical efficiency and scale 
efficiency do not change markedly during the period of non-binding TAC, from the 2008 to 
the 2010 quota years. That is to say, the re-entry of latent vessels over this period has not 
altered the homogeneity of the fleet in terms of its scale or technical efficiency. On the whole, 
the period of non-binding TAC caused vessels in the fishery to operate at a lower technical 
efficiency, but with about the same level of scale efficiency. The consistency of the scale 
efficiency over this period may reflect a per vessel pot limit that has applied in the fishery 
over the study period. 
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4.4.2.2 Capacity utilisation and efficiency during the period of non-binding TAC 
A second aim of the essay is to investigate whether capacity utilisation and efficiency in the 
Tasmanian rock lobster fishery declined during the period of non-binding TAC from the 2008 
to the 2010 quota years. We do this by first partitioning the fishery’s data into three distinct 
sub-periods, which correspond to the non-binding TAC (2008-2010), the quota years 
preceding the non-binding TAC (2000-2007) and the quota years following the non-binding 
TAC (2011-2013). The mean values and standard deviations of capacity utilisation, technical 
efficiency, and scale efficiency for these sub-periods and are reported in Table 4.3. The 
proportion of the fishery’s TAC that was harvested in each sub-period is also shown in 
Table 4.3, from which we confirm that the proportion of the TAC harvested in the 2008-2010 
sub-period (91.9 percent) was markedly below that observed in the two other 
sub-periods (98.8 percent and 97.5 percent, respectively).
6
 
  
                                                 
6
 Note that, due to a carry-over provision that was in place in the fishery during this time, a component of the 
uncaught quota in each of these quota years may have been carried over and harvested in the following quota 
year. 
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Table 4.3: Mean and standard deviation of capacity utilisation, technical efficiency and scale 
efficiency before (2000-07), during (2008-10) and after (2011-13) the period of the 
non-binding TAC 
  %TAC 
Harvested 
Unbiased 
Capacity Utilisation 
Output-orientated 
Technical Efficiency 
Output-orientated 
Scale Efficiency 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
2000-2007 98.8% 0.73 0.27 0.62 0.22 0.80 0.19 
2008-2010 91.9% 0.74 0.26 0.57 0.22 0.80 0.19 
2011-2013 97.5% 0.76 0.27 0.59 0.24 0.77 0.21 
 
 
The capacity utilisation increased only slightly over the three sub-periods in Table 4.3, and 
showed no evidence of decline during the sub-period corresponding to the non-binding TAC. 
Similarly, the scale efficiency remained unchanged between the first and second sub-periods, 
also giving no indication of a decline as a result of the non-binding TAC. However, the scale 
efficiency did fall by three percent in the last sub-period (2011-2013). The mean technical 
efficiency, in contrast, was around five percent lower in the sub-period corresponding to the 
non-binding TAC when compared with the two remaining sub-periods. Table 4.3 also shows 
that the standard deviations of the estimates of capacity utilisation and efficiency remain 
essentially unchanged over the three sub-periods. This confirms that there is no change in the 
dispersion of these estimates across the individual fishing vessels between the sub-periods, so 
that changes in capacity utilisation and efficiency seem to represent simultaneous changes 
among all vessels in the fishery. Therefore, the technical efficiency of most vessels has 
declined during the non-binding TAC, maybe with the exception of the harvesters that 
determine the technically efficient production frontier, and this might reflect the re-activation 
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of inefficient vessels when latent capital began to re-commence harvesting in the fishery from 
the 2008 quota year. 
To further explore how capacity utilisation and efficiency in the ITQ-managed fishery are 
affected by the TAC constraint, we calculate the partial correlation of capacity utilisation and 
the two measures of efficiency in the fishery with the TAC and the proportion of TAC 
harvested in each quota year. These coefficients are reported in Table 4.4 below. The results 
show a particularly high correlation between technical efficiency and the proportion of the 
TAC harvested in each quota year. This is consistent with conventional economic theory, 
which suggests that when the TAC is binding, so that a high proportion of the TAC is 
harvested, the ITQ mechanism will ensure that effort is allocated to the most efficient vessels, 
and thereby increase the mean technical efficiency in the fishery. The next highest correlation 
is between the scale efficiency and magnitude of the TAC constraint. This suggests that the 
fishery might on average operate in a region of increasing returns to scale, so that when the 
total harvest of the fishery increases, through a higher TAC, the scale efficiency also 
increases. Capacity utilisation is negatively correlated with both TAC and the proportion of 
TAC that is harvested. This observed negative correlation indicates an increase in the 
utilisation of capacity among active harvesters when the total harvest of the fishery declines. 
During a period of non-binding TAC, this could reflect vessels increasing their harvesting 
activity (i.e. shots per quota year) to take advantage of the low quota prices. Where there is a 
decrease in a binding TAC, on the other hand, the greater scarcity of the TAC may increase 
the quota price so that vessel operators take more shots per quota year to maintain profits. 
Similarly, scale efficiency is weakly negatively correlated with the proportion of the TAC 
harvested. When the TAC becomes binding, the decision about the scale of fishing is no 
longer made exclusively by the vessel operators, but is partly set by the fishery’s manager. As 
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a consequence, some fishers may no longer be able to independently determine the scale of 
their harvesting activities, and the mean scale efficiency of the fishery declines. Finally, 
technical efficiency is weakly positively correlated with the TAC. This might reflect a 
disproportionate increase in the harvest of the inefficient vessels as the total harvest of the 
fishery increases, but may also be down to statistical variation over the study period. 
 
Table 4.4: Partial correlation coefficients of capacity utilisation, technical efficiency and 
scale efficiency with the TAC and the proportion (%) TAC harvested respectively 
 
Capacity utilisation 
Technical 
efficiency Scale efficiency 
TAC -0.23 0.29 0.49 
% TAC harvested -0.31 0.64 -0.19 
 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This essay has investigated the implications for excess capacity and efficiency from the 
implementation of an ITQ system. It is commonly anticipated that an effective ITQ will 
reduce or eliminate excess capacity in the fishery. However, theory offers limited guidance as 
to the adjustment pathway in capacity required for the reduction in excess capacity to occur. 
Furthermore, most empirical estimates of capacity utilisation before and immediately after 
the introduction of an ITQ system indicate only modest reductions in excess 
capacity (Dupont et al., 2002, Solís et al., 2014b). This essay has measured excess capacity 
using the unbiased measure of capacity utilisation (Kirkley et al., 2002), and investigated 
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changes in excess capacity and efficiency over a fourteen year study period in the Tasmanian 
rock lobster fishery that closely followed the introduction of an ITQ system. The essay has 
also looked for evidence of the re-emergence of race behaviours in the excess capacity and 
efficiency scores of the fishery when it reverted to a limited entry open access paradigm 
under a non-binding TAC (Emery et al., 2014, Kompas et al., 2009, Grafton et al., 2007). 
Our results have revealed a consistently high level of capacity utilisation and low level of 
technical efficiency over the study period. Together these results point to low levels of excess 
capacity among the most efficient operators in the fishery, but possibly also an opportunity 
for some vessels to improve their use of variable inputs. The mean technical efficiency of the 
fishery has ranged between 53.0 and 68.0 percent over the study period, with the grand mean 
being 60.0 percent for all quota years. Solís et al. (2014a) find technical efficiency scores of 
41.0 percent and 57.0 percent for two different classes of fishing vessels in the Gulf of 
Mexico red snapper fishery, after the introduction of the quota management system in that 
fishery. In an investigation of the ITQ-managed New Zealand rock lobster fishery, Sharp et al. 
(2004) find technical efficiency scores ranging from 74.0 percent to 82.0 percent. Scale 
efficiency remains virtually unchanged over the study period. High levels of scale efficiency 
suggest that, overall, the rock lobster fishers were operating at a scale of production that was 
close to the technically optimum production scale. The mean scale efficiency in the Tasmania 
rock lobster fishery has varied between 73.0 and 83.0 percent over the study period with a 
grand mean of 80.0 percent for all quota years. These measures of scale efficiency are 
comparable to other studies of wild catch fisheries. Under controlled access management of 
the Northern Gulf of Mexico reef fishery, Weninger and Waters (2003) find scale efficiency 
of 79.0 percent. For the small scale fishing fleet in Sardinia, for example, Madau et al. (2009) 
find scale efficiency of 90.0 percent. In the case of the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery, a 
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measured correlation between the TAC and the mean level of scale efficiency over the period 
of this study reveals a positive relationship that is consistent with increasing returns to scale, 
suggesting the fishery was close to, but below, the technically optimum production scale. 
The composition (i.e. heterogeneity) of the fishing fleet is reflected by the dispersion of 
capacity utilisation, technical efficiency and scale efficiency, which we find have remained 
mostly unchanged over the study period. The skew of the distribution of technical efficiency, 
as indicated by the difference between the mean and median values, suggests the presence of 
outlying vessels with particularly high levels of technical efficiency. This could point to 
differences in the knowledge of the fishery, i.e. some operators knowing better times or 
places to harvest rock lobster and therefore are able to achieve a higher technical efficiency 
than other operators. In the case of the scale efficiency, the same measure of skew suggests a 
highly inefficient scale of operation among some vessels, which may reflect differences in the 
production technologies across vessels or point to some fishers being unable to source quota 
in the decentralised market. Our results reveal a negative correlation between the dispersion 
and the median value of scale efficiency which suggests changes in the fishery’s total harvest 
have a larger impact on the scale efficiency of some vessels over others. Lastly, the skew of 
capacity utilisation over the study period indicates the presence of a number of vessels of 
extremely low capacity utilisation, and this may reflect the suitability of different sized 
vessels to the general environmental conditions of the fishery (i.e. weather, sea, location of 
lobsters, etc.). 
The analysis in this essay has shown that the increase in excess capacity over time, following 
the introduction of an ITQ system in the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery, is limited. This 
essay has found weak evidence that the adjustment of the fishery occurs over a prolonged 
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time period following the introduction of an ITQ system. A period of increasing scale and 
technical efficiency from the 2000 to the 2004 quota years could indicate a delayed or 
prolonged adjustment of the fishery after the introduction of the ITQ system in 1998. A 
prolonged period of adjustment is also evidenced by a steady decline in vessel numbers up to 
the 2007 quota year, after which the TAC became non-binding. However, no evidence is 
found for a marked change in capacity utilisation over the study period. We also do not find 
any indication of an increase in excess capacity (i.e. a reduction in capacity utilisation) when 
race to fish behaviour re-emerged in the fishery from the 2008 to the 2010 quota years. 
An important caveat to our research is that data from the stock assessment reports for the 
Tasmanian rock lobster fishery (Hartmann et al., 2013) indicate that most of the change in 
vessel numbers as a result of the ITQ system seems to have occurred immediately following 
the introduction of that system (i.e. from the 1998 to the 2000 quota years). While there is 
limited evidence in other studies for reductions in excess capacity in the years immediately 
following the introduction of the ITQ system (Solís et al., 2014b, Dupont et al., 2002), a data 
limitation in this essay has meant that our analysis has been unable to establish whether this is 
the case for the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery. Dupont et al. (2002) measure capacity 
utilisation before and after the introduction of an ITQ system in the multispecies 
Scotia-Fundy mobile gear fishery. After the introduction of the ITQ system in the 1991 
fishing season they find the mean capacity utilisation of 65.3 percent, compared with 64.9 
percent in the 1990 fishing season, just prior to the introduction of the system. For the Gulf of 
Mexico red snapper fishery, Solís et al. (2014b) measure mean capacity utilisation before and 
after the introduction of an ITQ system of 21.1 percent and 22.5 percent respectively. Similar 
changes may occur in the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery, but this is yet to be established, and 
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an investigation of the behaviour of the fishery in the quota years immediately preceding and 
following the 1998 quota year is an important area for further research. 
ITQ systems have become an increasingly commonplace regulation in world fisheries. While 
reducing vessel numbers, we have found that the effect of such a system on excess capacity 
has been negligible over the period of this study. In particular, our analysis has revealed that a 
period of non-binding TAC in the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery, over which evidence of the 
well-known race to fish has been observed (Emery et al., 2014), was not associated with an 
increase in excess capacity. The latent capital that re-commenced harvesting during this 
period did not significantly alter the ratio of the technically efficient output (i.e. the output of 
the technically efficient vessel) to the capacity output of the vessels in each category of 
overall length. As a consequence the mean level of unbiased capacity utilisation did not 
change markedly. Finally, it is not clear whether the measured levels of capacity utilisation in 
the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery represent wasteful excess capacity or economically 
efficient excess capacity (i.e. capacity that is maintained by fishers to take advantage of the 
spatial and temporal heterogeneity of the resource). Such ‘efficient’ excess capacity has been 
demonstrated in the case of a sole-owner fishery with stochastic fluctuations in recruitment 
by Poudel et al. (2013). Since capacity utilisation in the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery did 
not substantially change during a period of non-binding TAC, when the race to fish 
re-emerged in the fishery, it is possible that the underutilisation of capacity that is measured 
in the fishery represents some efficient level. However, it is also possible that a combination 
of the licence limitation and the per vessel pot limit that applied over the study period have 
limited the expansion of capacity during the non-binding TAC to that caused by the re-entry 
of latent vessels, and therefore prohibited further wasteful excess capacity from appearing in 
the fishery over that period. 
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Finally, the catchability of lobsters in the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery can change 
dramatically within quota years, both by location and time of year, and also between quota 
years of the fishery. Some of the variation in the excess capacity and efficiency over the 
study period may reflect these changes, and a second stage regression involving vessel level 
social and demographic data could reveal covariates that deepen our understanding of the 
harvesting behaviour in the fishery. While, at the time of this study, the data required for this 
regression were not readily available, such an analysis might form a useful avenue for further 
research. 
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Chapter 5. Thesis Conclusion 
The extent of the problem of excess capacity in world fisheries is still largely unknown, and 
capacity and capacity utilisation remain important topics for both theoretical and empirical 
investigation by fisheries economists. This thesis has contributed to this area of research 
through its investigation of the roles played by capital malleability and environmental 
variation in the development of excess capacity when race to fish and race to invest 
behaviours are prominent in the fishery, and has also investigated excess capacity when the 
race to fish exists in the case of a managed fishery. 
The thesis has shown that malleability of capital is of central importance to the problem of 
excess capacity in fisheries where the race to fish and race to invest are prominent. The first 
essay shows that the range of steady state levels of excess capacity in such fisheries is 
directly linked to the gap between the purchase and resale prices of capital. The essay shows 
that there is less potential for excess capacity when these prices are close together, and it is 
less costly to dispose of fishing capital. Furthermore, when capital is non-malleable, the first 
essay reveals a potential trade-off between excess capacity and the biological condition of the 
fishery, suggesting that caution should be applied in the use of technical excess capacity as an 
indication of a fishery’s health. Lastly, the essay demonstrates how higher initial levels of 
capital in the fishery will result in more overexploitation, a higher capital stock and less 
excess capacity in the steady state; and understanding this trade-off will help managers 
charged with managing fishing capacity. The second essay of this thesis has shown how the 
malleability of capital is an important determinant of the magnitude and persistence of excess 
capacity in race to fish and invest fisheries where environmental variation is important. In 
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contrast to the first essay, the second essay represents the malleability of capital by the rate of 
capital depreciation. When the capital is highly non-malleable, investments in capacity that 
are stimulated by periods of favourable environmental conditions remain in the fishery for 
long periods of time, creating a protracted level of excess capacity. 
The role of environmental variation in the development of excess capacity is investigated in 
the second essay of the thesis. In general, this essay finds that the level of excess capacity that 
occurs in the fishery due to environmental variation is transitory, in that it is self-correcting 
over time. However, the significance of such excess capacity depends critically on the 
originating fluctuation in environmental conditions. In the case of positive fluctuations, the 
essay shows that there is an increase in fishing capacity as the fishers invest in additional 
capital to take advantage of better fishing conditions. When the increase in recruitment is 
transient, this extra capital leads to excess capacity when the fishing conditions return to 
‘normal’. When the increase in recruitment is permanent, i.e. for a positive regime shift, the 
extra capital continues to be fully utilised by the fishers and there is no excess capacity. The 
deterioration in fishing conditions in the case of negative regime shifts, or as a result of 
transient negative fluctuations, also generates excess capacity. In both cases, the drop in 
recruitment causes excess capacity the same as the return to ‘normal’ conditions in the case 
of transient positive fluctuations. For transient negative fluctuations, episodes of excess 
capacity conclude when the fishery’s recruitment returns to ‘normal’, so that there is minimal 
change in the capital stock as a result of these fluctuations. In the case of negative regime 
shifts, however, the decrease in recruitment is permanent and the level of excess capacity 
dissipates away over time with the depreciation of capital, so that there is a permanent 
reduction in the capital stock. When there are regular cyclical fluctuations in recruitment, 
periodic improvements in the fishing conditions stimulate inefficient investment from myopic 
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fishers, which depreciate during the negative phase of the recruitment cycle. Simulations 
presented in the second essay demonstrate how this process can lead to a repeated cycle of 
excess capacity in the fishery. 
The third essay of this thesis has investigated changes in excess capacity and efficiency over 
a time period that closely followed the introduction of an ITQ system in the Tasmanian rock 
lobster fishery; and also examined changes in those measures when the fishery entered a 
period of non-binding TAC from the 2008 to the 2010 quota years. It is commonly argued 
that by mitigating the race to fish the implementation of an ITQ system will reduce or 
eliminate excess capacity in the fishery. The results in the third essay of the thesis, however, 
find little evidence for such a change over the prolonged period of the Tasmanian rock lobster 
fishery that was examined. The analysis has demonstrated that the re-emergence of race 
behaviour in the fishery during a period of non-binding TAC was not associated with an 
increase in excess capacity. A reduction in technical efficiency was observed over this period 
to coincide with the re-entry of latent vessels, but no evidence was found for a decrease in 
unbiased capacity utilisation (i.e. an increase in excess capacity).  
In conclusion, this thesis has particularly shown how the malleability of capital and 
fluctuations in the environmental conditions can contribute to the level of excess capacity, 
when the race to fish and race to invest are prominent. However, research in the thesis has a 
number of specific limitations, each of which suggests avenues for potentially fruitful further 
research. These limitations and avenues for further research are discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
Firstly, the malleability of capital is defined in terms of the rate of depreciation or by the 
difference between the purchase and resale prices of capital, as is common in the theoretical 
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literature. However, other economic factors might also play a role. For instance, inflexibility 
in the capital stock might arise due to an ageing workforce, where fishers’ ability to retrain 
and transition to alternative occupations is limited. The malleability of capital might also 
increase by improving the liquidity of capital markets; reducing barriers to capital mobility, 
such as the transferability of fishing rights; or by facilitating the development of viable 
alternatives to fishing. However, any measure that improves the mobility of capital between 
fisheries would need to be balanced against creating the potential for (increased) spill-over of 
fishing effort. Given the importance of the malleability of capital for the problem of excess 
capacity, a further investigation of the factors that define such malleability forms an 
important area for further research. 
Secondly, the models of the fishery in this thesis have adopted a representation of myopic 
behaviour known as projection bias. However, the role of expectations in determining fishers’ 
behaviour is an understudied area, and a number of models of such behaviour have been 
developed in the theoretical literature, including myopic representations based on fishers’ 
discount rate as well as models of perfect foresight. Further investigation into the nature of 
fishers’ investment decisions would enhance our understanding of the processes leading to 
the development of excess capacity. 
Finally, the thesis offers no way of distinguishing between wasteful excess capacity and 
economically efficient excess capacity. For example, under certain circumstances excess 
capacity can exist in the fishery to take advantage of fluctuations in environmental conditions. 
Fishers may maintain a buffer stock of capacity to increase harvesting during seasons where 
the recruitment of the fishery is higher than usual. Such behaviour was shown to be optimal 
in the case of the sole-owner fishery by Poudel et al. (2013), and while many empirical 
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studies (including the one presented in this thesis) quantify levels of capacity utilisation in 
world fisheries, the interpretation of these results is hindered by this potential for both 
wasteful and efficient forms of excess capacity. The measurement of excess capacity is 
therefore contextual to the structure and the effectiveness of fishing regulations, so that there 
is a need to exercise caution in the use of such measures as indicators of fishery performance. 
Some method for distinguishing wasteful and efficient component from empirical measures 
of excess capacity would be advantageous. 
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